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ABSTRACT 
   
Accountability has been commonly referred to in the literature as a person’s 
expectation about others’ evaluations. However, in this study, I develop an alternative 
perspective of leader accountability by defining it as an individual’s degree of ownership 
regarding good or poor performance and acceptance of associated rewards or disciplinary 
actions. Based on attribution theory, leaders can have internal and external ownership 
regarding good and poor performance. I propose that accountability can be categorized 
into two correlated but distinct aspects: self-benefitting and other-benefitting. Leader 
self-benefitting accountability refers to leaders’ attributions towards their own benefits 
(i.e., internal attribution of good performance and external attribution of poor 
performance). Leader other-benefitting accountability reflects leaders’ attributions 
towards others’ interests (i.e., internal attribution of poor performance and external 
attribution of good performance). Using multiple samples, I develop and validate a leader 
accountability scale, and then test a theoretical model with a focus on leader 
accountability and collective accountability (i.e., a group of individuals’ degree of 
ownership) by collecting data from 57 leaders and 162 followers in three Chinese 
companies. The findings show that leader humility is positively related to leader other-
benefitting accountability. Both leader self-benefitting and other-benefitting 
accountability are associated with collective self-benefitting and other-benefitting 
accountability, respectively. Moreover, the relationship between leader self-benefitting 
and collective self-benefitting accountability is enhanced when the leader has high 
organization prototypicality. Furthermore, collective self-benefitting accountability 
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decreases leader effectiveness and team effectiveness, while collective other-benefitting 
accountability increases leader effectiveness.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Buck Stops Here 
~ U.S. President Harry S. Truman, 1945 
“The buck stops here” is a famous quote from U.S. President Harry Truman (May 
8, 1884 - December 26, 1972, the thirty-third President of the United States: 1945-1953). 
It derives from the slang expression "pass the buck". By taking the buck (so to speak), 
rather than passing it on, President Truman claimed to take accountability as a leader. He 
indicated that a leader with accountability should not pass the responsibility for actions 
and outcomes to someone else; instead, the leader should associate him/herself with 
decisions and be accountable for the decisions’ outcomes.  
Accountability, in general, is an important principle serving as a bond to maintain 
our social systems (Frink & Klimoski, 1998). In a discussion of justice and punishment, 
early Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle raised the notion of misconduct accountability 
(Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994). In recent times, Adserà, Boix 
and Payne (2003) also posited that decision makers such as politicians should fulfill their 
obligations by being accountable for their actions. Moreover, popular media have called 
for accountability in business, given the increasing accountability-related scandals of our 
business leaders. For example, Leader-Chivée (2014) emphasized that leaders should 
own the crisis and be willing to take accountability. Furthermore, Cavuto (2014) noted 
that leaders should take accountability by admitting the mistakes that they have made and 
accepting blame, rather than hiding mistakes. In fact, these scandals have made President 
Truman’s desk sign more relevant than ever before. 
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 Existing literature suggests that leader accountability reflects the extent to which 
leaders meet expectations from external forces (Ferris, Mitchell, Canavan, Drink, & 
Hopper, 1995; Frink & Klimoski, 1998; Tetlock, 1983). If leaders are held accountable 
by others (e.g., followers or superiors), they are more likely to become vigilant 
information processors to provide detailed justifications to satisfy others’ expectations 
(Tetlock, 1983). Given this perspective, researchers have defined accountability as “an 
implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings 
and actions to others” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 255). Others similarly posit that leader 
accountability involves leaders’ expectations that there are potential rewards or sanctions 
based on evaluations from others (Hall, 2005; Hochwarter, Kacmar, & Ferris, 2003). 
Much of the leader accountability research conducted to date has been based primarily on 
this definition. For example, Hall and her colleagues (2004) found that accountability, 
conceived as external expectations that are placed on leaders, relates positively to 
followers’ trust in leaders.  
It is certainly reasonable and informative to approach accountability from a 
perspective of external expectations and the potential rewards or sanctions resulting from 
those expectations (Ferris et al., 1995; Frink & Klimoski, 1998; Hochwarter, Kacmar, & 
Ferris, 2003). However, this definition largely ignores leaders’ ownership of 
accountability and the personal acceptance of associated punishment and rewards. In 
addition, under this definition, it is not clear that whether the rewards or punishment are 
commensurate with the performance. Researchers have shown that intrinsic ownership is 
more important than external forces regarding their relationship with performance, and 
one’s intrinsic ownership of tasks can independently contribute to personal achievement, 
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even without extrinsic forces (Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 2014). I argue that leader 
accountability goes beyond merely reacting to others’ expectations by emphasizing that 
leaders can proactively take ownership of performance and associated outcomes. I 
propose that if leaders accept no personal consequences (e.g., disciplinary actions) when 
things go wrong, they are not displaying a sense of ownership of poor performance, and 
thus, not being accountable. In the case of good performance, personal ownership of 
accountability entails accepting credit or rewards. Therefore, I define leader 
accountability as a leader’s degree of ownership regarding good or poor performance and 
acceptance of associated rewards or disciplinary actions.  
Furthermore, taking into consideration both good and poor performance, I 
contend that it is possible for leaders to have strong internal and strong external 
attributions regarding both good and poor performance. Thus, leader accountability can 
be categorized into two aspects: (1) self-benefitting, and (2) other-benefitting. As shown 
in Table 1, leader self-benefitting accountability refers to leaders’ attribution towards 
securing their own personal benefits (i.e., internal attribution of good performance and 
external attribution of poor performance). Leader other-benefitting accountability reflects 
leaders’ attributions toward enhancing the benefits of other organizational members (i.e., 
internal attributions of poor performance and external attribution of good performance). 
Moreover, I conceive self-benefitting accountability and other-benefitting accountability 
as not representing two opposite ends of the same continuum. Instead, I argue that while 
these two aspects of leader accountability are likely to be negatively correlated, they 
nevertheless are distinct from each other. As argued by Smith and Lewis (2011), leaders’ 
behaviors may include a blend of both positive and negative qualities. Zhang, Waldman, 
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Han, and Li (2014) have also argued conceptually, and found empirically, that leaders 
could display two competing, yet correlated, behaviors (e.g., concern for self and concern 
for others). Therefore, I propose that self-benefitting and other-benefitting accountability 
are negatively correlated, but still separate, and a leader can potentially be high on both 
aspects of accountability. As an example, a leader might take credit for a team’s good 
performance, but also share the limelight with followers (Zhang et al., 2014). He/she 
might also assume internal ownership, rather than blaming team members, when things 
go wrong. 
In addition to advancing the accountability literature by providing a new 
definition of leader accountability, I seek to explore its antecedents and effects. I develop 
and test a theoretical model with a focus on accountability that considers internal and 
external predictors of leader accountability, and how followers can learn from a leader’s 
accountability and form a collective accountability in a team. Collective accountability 
refers to a group of individuals’ degree of ownership regarding good or poor performance 
and acceptance of associated rewards or disciplinary actions. Moreover, I suggest that the 
learning process tends to be stronger if a focal leader represents the organization’s values 
and goals. Furthermore, collective accountability further relates to team-level outcomes. 
Specifically, my dissertation research attempts to make the following contributions to the 
literature.  
First, in line with social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997, 1999), by examining 
both personal and environmental factors, this study contributes to an understanding of the 
factors promoting leaders’ acceptance and ownership of performance. Social cognitive 
theory suggests that internal values can regulate behaviors in addition to external forces 
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(Bandura, 1999). Understanding how or why leaders derive their sense of accountability 
is essential to developing a theory on leader accountability and its effects. Internal 
characterstics such as humility may closely relate to a leader’s accountability and its 
associated results because humility describes how one perceives oneself in relation to 
others (Owens, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2013). Moreover, departing from the current 
literature that conceives a leader’s expectation about others’ evaluations as the 
accountability construct, I label that conceptualization as “external expectations” and 
explicitly model it as an externally-derived antecedent of leader accountability. In short, 
by unpacking the antecedents of leader accountability into internal forces (humility) and 
external pressures (external expectations), we can better understand why leaders might or 
might not accept ownership of performance, and associated repercussions or personal 
outcomes, and thus possess accountability. 
The second contribution of my study is to expand our knowledge of the 
consequences of leader accountability in teams. In other words, leader accountability 
cascades to connect with followers’ collective accountability. Social learning theory 
suggests that individuals can learn through observing and modeling (Bandura, 1977, 
1986). Followers can learn from their leaders by observing the extent of their 
accountability actions. More specifically, if a leader only holds followers (not him or 
herself) accountable for bad outcomes and blames others for mistakes, followers are 
inclined to learn to display self-benefitting accountability in similar ways. If a leader 
holds him/herself personally accountable for the team’s actions and accepts personal 
sanctions for a team’s wrongdoings or poor performance, followers tend to learn and 
reciprocate by themselves displaying other-benefitting accountability. Therefore, 
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accountable leaders might increase the collective level of similar accountability behaviors 
by followers.  
Furthermore, I contribute to the social learning literature by exploring 
circumstances under which the learning process might be more effective. I suggest that 
being a leader who represents the organization’s values and goals (i.e., leader 
prototypicality; Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Hogg, 2001) can enhance the social learning 
process. If a leader is prototypical of the organization, followers are more likely to imitate 
similar accountable behaviors displayed by the leader. If a leader is not prototypical, 
followers may be less likely to imitate his/her self-benefitting or other-benefitting 
behaviors.  
A further contribution of this dissertation is to examine consequences of 
accountability at a collective level. Collective accountability could be considered to be 
negative in relation to performance because if members share accountability in a team, 
the accountability may get diffused, and members may not make personal efforts to the 
team (Whyte, 1991). However, previous research has only focused on the collective self-
benefitting accountability (e.g., Forsyth, Zyzniewski, Giammanco, 2002) and ignored the 
other-benefitting aspect of collective accountability. Collective other-benefitting 
accountability could result in positive team effectiveness because team members take 
personal blame regarding poor performance and give each other credit for favorable 
performance. Thus, team members are taking charge of their actions and make 
contributions to enhance team outcomes. Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical model, 
which I will discuss in more detail below. Although specific to leader accountability, this 
model is in line with a generic framework for considering leader effectiveness as outlined 
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by Yukl (2010), which includes personal predictors of leader behavior, as well as 
contextual moderators of the effect of behavior on outcomes.  
In the following chapters, I first review the accountability literature and compare 
my definition of leader accountability with similar constructs. Building on my definition, 
I develop my theory and hypotheses about leader and collective accountability (an overall 
model is shown in Figure 1). In addition, I develop a new measure of accountability and 
validate the measure. Then I discuss the implications of my results, study limitations and 
propose future research directions.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This dissertation aims to articulate what leader accountability is, to understand 
what factors promote leader accountability, and to delineate its relationship with 
followers’ collective accountability, which may in turn relate to team outcomes. In this 
chapter, I review the theoretical and empirical research pertaining to accountability based 
on the external expectation-based definition that was overviewed in the prior chapter, and 
provide justification for the alternative conceptualization that I propose in this study. 
Then I compare my ownership-based definition of accountability with other constructs 
that appear to be similar.  
Review of Accountability Literature  
In the management field, accountability has been examined at both the firm and 
individual levels. Models of accountability at the firm level are based on agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Shareholders’ agents, such as CEOs and managers, are monitored 
with accountability systems, including formal mechanisms (e.g., accounting procedures, 
rules/policies, behavioral clauses in executive contracts), as well as informal mechanisms 
such as organizational norms and cultures (Frink & Klimoski, 1998, 2004). For example, 
Castilla (2015) argued that organizational accountability includes a set of procedures to 
make people responsible for fair rewards distribution in the performance-reward system. 
At the individual level, the majority of work on accountability can be traced to the work 
of Tetlock’s (1992) social contingency model of accountability. In his model, Tetlock 
(1992) articulated that accountability, as one social contingency, could drive individuals’ 
behaviors and judgments.  
 9 
 I refer to the predominant, existing conceptualization of accountability as 
“external expectation” because Lerner and Tetlock (1999) defined this perspective of 
accountability as an individual’s expectation that others could evaluate him/her, and thus, 
he/she needs to justify his/her actions to other people. In other words, accountability as an 
expectation is an internal state of mind (Frink & Klimoski, 1998), although it is based on 
one’s social context and the extent to which an individual feels that others are holding 
him/her accountable. A leader’s external evaluation expectation is the leader’s subjective 
perception about how various external forces (e.g., top level managers, co-workers, or 
subordinates) hold him/her accountable. Based on Lerner and Tetlock’s (1999) argument, 
a leader is held accountable because top managers, co-workers and followers can 
potentially observe and identify the focal leader’s actions. In addition, superiors or team 
members can evaluate the leader’s performance, and the leader needs to provide the 
justification and reasons for why he/she makes certain decisions. There are potential 
rewards or sanctions based on those evaluations (Hall, 2005; Hochwarter, Kacmar, & 
Ferris, 2003). A more detailed summary of the literature about external expectation-based 
accountability is presented in Table 2.  
Based on Lerner and Tetlock’ s work, Hochwarter et al. (2003) developed an 
eight-item measure of an individual’s external expectations. In line with the above 
discussion, it reflects one’s own perception of the extent to which others hold one 
accountable. Examples items are “I often have to explain to others (e.g., followers or 
supervisors) why I do certain things at work” and “top management holds me 
accountable for all of my decisions”. Hall (2005) further validated the construct with the 
same eight items developed by Hochwarter et al. (2003) and examined several 
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antecedents of external expectations. She found that if individuals feel that there are 
higher informal norms regarding accountability in organizations (e.g., norms that people 
should be accountable to their own actions), they would have stronger external 
expectations. Moreover, personality traits also relate to an individual’s external 
expectations. For example, individuals who are high on agreeableness care more about 
others and are more cooperative, so they might also perceive stronger external 
expectations from others (Hall, 2005).   
Toward a New Conceptualization of Leader Accountability  
Although some studies have been building on Tetlock’s social contingency model 
of accountability, I maintain that our current understanding of accountability is 
incomplete. Defining accountability as perceived expectations and justifications for one’s 
actions largely ignores the ownership aspect of accountability. Hall (2005) proposed that 
external expectations could come from self and others. In other words, the audience of a 
leader’s actions can include him/herself (Frink & Klimoski, 1998). However, her 
definition mixes self and others’ expectations together without distinguishing how one’s 
internal motive or sense of ownership is different from external expectations. Moreover, 
while some researchers even referred to external evaluation expectations as “willingness 
to accept responsibilities” (Wood & Winston, 2005, p. 87), the literature still mostly 
focuses on external expectations. For example, Wood and Winston (2007) developed 
their scale of leader accountability with three dimensions: (1) responsibility (e.g., sense 
of obligations and avoid making excuses), (2) openness (e.g., open to communication), 
and (3) answerability (e.g., answer questions from others). They mixed acceptance of 
responsibility with obligations and external expectations and did not distinguish how 
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acceptance of responsibility is different from external expectations. In addition, the 
rewards and punishments associated with external expectations are contingent upon 
others’ evaluations (Ferris et al., 1995; Frink & Klimoski, 1998). In other words, external 
expectations do not involve leaders’ actual acceptance of rewards and disciplinary actions. 
In a nutshell, researchers still largely ignore the extent to which people accept and take 
ownership of responsibility (i.e., “the buck stops here”), as well as associated rewards or 
disciplinary actions in their discussion of external expectations. As such, my definition of 
accountability emphasizes a leader’s ownership of good or poor performance and 
acceptance of associated rewards or disciplinary actions. Below, I propose that it is the 
actual ownership of responsibility that is key in terms of relating directly to followers and 
team outcomes. 
Attribution theory pertains to the intrinsic ownership of accountability because 
accountability can be viewed as involving how leaders themselves make attributions 
regarding performance. Cumming and Anton (1990) specified that accountability 
involves accepting responsibility, both cognitively and emotionally. If a leader accepts 
the ownership of the team’s actions or performance, he/she makes internal attributions. 
Ferris et al. (1995) articulated that the internal part of accountability relies largely on the 
acceptance of accountability, while external accountability involves whether external 
forces hold people accountable for performance. Even if a leader is held accountable by 
others when there is poor performance in a team, the leader may not really accept or take 
the ownership of that performance. For example, the leader can still make external 
attributions (e.g., blame other members or the outside environment) when it comes to 
poor team performance.  
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Moreover, leaders can take ownership regarding both good and poor performance. 
Leader accountability, conceived in terms of ownership of performance, is increasingly 
important because organizational leaders oftentimes do not take ownership with regard to 
poor performance. For example, managers may not receive any disciplinary actions, 
despite being associated with wrongdoings (Gibson & Schroeder, 2003). They may 
blame others (e.g., followers) and even force others to assume accountability. On the 
other hand, leaders can also assume accountability by taking excessive ownership of 
good performance, thus not giving enough credit to others (e.g., followers). Either way, 
negative outcomes could result. I consider both of these forms of accountability as self-
benefitting in that leaders act towards their own personal benefit (i.e., internal attribution 
of good performance and external attribution of poor performance). In contrast, if leaders 
blame themselves for poor performance and let others take the credit for good 
performance, these leaders are considered as having other-benefitting accountability that 
acts toward the interests of other organizational members (i.e., internal attribution of poor 
performance and external attribution of good performance).  
Further, I conceive self-benefitting accountability and other-benefitting 
accountability as not representing two opposite ends of the same continuum. Although 
some researchers have suggested that being self-benefitting is strongly negatively 
correlated with being other-benefitting (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004), I argue that these 
two aspects of leader accountability may be moderately negatively correlated, but 
nevertheless, distinctive from each other. Unlike self-interested culture and altruistic 
culture that are the opposite ends of one continuum (Jones, Felps, & Bigley, 2007), 
positive and negative individual qualities can coexist (Smith & Lewis, 2011). For 
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example, leaders can simultaneously display two competing, even seemingly paradoxical, 
behaviors such as concern for self and concern for others (Zhang et al., 2014). In addition, 
empirical evidence has shown that what might appear to be irreconcilable poles of a 
paradox can actually complement each other (Chen, Xie, & Chang, 2011; De Dreu, 2006; 
De Dreu & Nauta, 2009). For example, Owens, Wallace, and Waldman (2015) also found 
that leaders could be both narcissistic and humble. The negative influence of leaders’ 
narcissistic traits such as being extremely confident can be tempered by also 
acknowledging their own limitations. In a similar manner, I propose that it is possible for 
leaders to display both high self-benefitting and high other-benefitting accountability.  
Comparing Leader Accountability with Other Similar Constructs 
To better characterize my definition of accountability, I will develop a 
nomological network of how this ownership-based leader accountability relates to other 
constructs. I frame leader accountability as a leader’s tendency towards ownership rooted 
in attribution theory (Weiner, 1985). As a construct, accountability has been used 
interchangeable with responsibility by some researchers (Hall, 2005). In addition, this 
acceptance of personal ownership of performance might to some degree, coincide with 
some existing models of effective leadership behaviors such as ethical leadership. 
However, existing leadership constructs do not directly take into consideration leaders’ 
attributions and ownership of performance. For example, accountability may be 
perceived as an ethical behavior displayed by leaders because it may be appropriate for 
leaders to take accountability based on existing norms (Brown, Trevino, & Harrison, 
2005). Nevertheless, ethical leadership differs from leader accountability in that the latter 
focuses more specifically on ownership of performance issues.  
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Comparison between accountability and responsibility. Responsibility has 
been considered as a synonym of accountability (e.g., Hackman & Oldham, 1975). 
However, responsibility is different from accountability as defined in my research. 
Responsibility has been defined as “the personal causal influence on an event” (Cumming 
& Anton, 1990, p. 626). Responsibility focuses more on the targets or events; leaders can 
have responsibility towards multiple objects including people, organizations and the 
physical environment (Winter, 1991). For example, leaders can have responsibility 
towards different constituents, including shareholders or broader stakeholders groups 
(e.g., customers, the greater communities and the nature environment) (Pless et al. 2012). 
In other words, responsibility deals with to whom a leader should have obligations – by 
either the leader’s own admonition or in the eyes of others. However, leader 
accountability emphasizes how leaders should assume their responsibility, especially in 
terms of ownership or acceptance of personal outcomes based on performance. That is, 
leader accountability describes leaders’ internal and external attributions regarding 
performance pertaining to their responsibilities. Such performance could be based on a 
narrow characterization of performance (e.g., productivity or financial performance), or 
the needs of stakeholders more broadly conceived (i.e., social performance), subject to 
leaders’ own interpretations of responsibility, or to whom they have obligations. 
Therefore, leader accountability is based on leader responsibility, but goes further by 
focusing on leaders’ personal ownership regarding performance and personal outcomes 
(e.g., rewards and punishments).  
Comparison between accountability and ethical leadership. Another relevant 
concept in existing literature is ethical leadership. Ethical leadership refers to “the 
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demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and 
interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-
way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making” (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 
2005, p.120). Based on this definition, a leader is considered as ethical if he/she has 
followers’ best interests in mind, makes fair and balanced decisions, and follows ethical 
values (Brown et al., 2005). My definitions of leader accountability and ethical leadership 
overlap in their focus on the extent of caring about others. For example, if a leader makes 
internal attributions and accepts the ownership of poor team performance, rather than 
blaming followers for mistakes, the leader is demonstrating concern about the benefits of 
followers. In this way, accountable leaders are likely to be considered as more ethical. 
However, leader accountability is also different from ethical leadership. Leader 
accountability focuses more specifically on leaders’ attributions about performance 
without actively promoting ethics among team members, while ethical leadership is more 
about being an ethical role model and communicating ethical standards to followers.  
In the next section, I will introduce hypotheses that build on this new definition of 
accountability.    
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter, I will develop my theory and hypotheses regarding antecedents 
and outcomes of leader accountability. Drawing from social cognitive theory (Bandura, 
1997, 1999), I argue that leaders’ personal traits and leaders’ perceptions towards the 
external environment can associate with their own accountability behaviors. In addition, 
followers can learn from leaders’ accountability behaviors and form collective 
accountability in teams. This process is stronger if those leaders represent organizations’ 
values and goals. Furthermore, followers’ collective self-benefitting and other-benefitting 
accountability relate to subsequent team outcomes such as leader effectiveness and team 
effectiveness.   
 Antecedents of Leader Accountability 
Social cognitive theory suggests that leaders’ personal traits could contribute to 
their behaviors (Bandura, 1997; 1999). One key personal characteristic that is relevant to 
leader accountability is humility. Humility is a positive trait describing a leader’s 
willingness to see him/herself more accurately, appreciate other people’s strengths and be 
open to feedback from others (Owens, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2013). Humility reflects not 
only how one perceives his/her own roles, but also how one interacts with others in 
general. Humility differs from accountability because humility is a broader personal 
characteristic that could affect various aspects of an individual’s behavior, and it does not 
involve how leaders accept ownership of performance per se. However, humility could be 
related to leader accountability because how a leader perceives him/herself in relation to 
others may associate with how the leader attributes his/her performance (or lack thereof).  
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Specifically, I expect that less humble leaders are more likely to display self-
benefitting accountability. For example, Owens et al. (2013) indicated that less humble 
leaders would behave in a more self-interested way. Less humble leaders see themselves 
as closer to being perfect and do not admit their mistakes. Thus, they tend not to 
acknowledge their own weaknesses, and they blame others when things go wrong. In 
addition, less humble leaders consider others’ contributions to the group as threats to their 
own status and are less likely to acknowledge other people’s strengths (Exline & Geyer, 
2004). Thus, less humble leaders are more likely to take credit for good performance and 
consider good performance as a result of their own contributions, rather than others’ 
efforts (e.g., followers’ contributions).  
In addition, more humble leaders are likely to exhibit more other-benefitting 
accountability. Humble leaders can recognize not only their strengths, but also 
weaknesses. For example, Ou et al. (2014) found that more humble leaders empower 
their followers because these leaders can acknowledge their own limitations in achieving 
outcomes. Thus, leaders with high levels of humility tend to blame themselves when 
there are bad outcomes because they may perceive their weaknesses as main reasons for 
the bad outcomes. In addition, Owens and Hekman (2012) implied that more humble 
leaders would appreciate others’ efforts in achieving favorable outcomes and are more 
likely to provide more rewards to others (e.g., followers) when such outcomes occur. 
Therefore, I propose that,  
Hypothesis 1: Leader humility is negatively related to leader self-benefitting 
accountability.  
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Hypothesis 2: Leader humility is positively related to leader other-benefitting 
accountability.  
As mentioned earlier, a leader’s external expectation is the leader’s perception 
about the extent to which various external forces (e.g., top level managers, co-workers, or 
subordinates) hold him/her accountable (Hochwarter et al., 2003). While that 
conceptualization of accountability has been predominant in the literature, I view it as an 
externally-based antecedent of my own conceptualization of accountability, which is 
based on ownership. In line with social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1999), I consider 
external expectations as a contextual factor influencing leader self-benefitting 
accountability. In particular, I argue that external expectations could decrease leaders’ 
self-benefitting accountability. First, researchers have shown that leaders who are held 
accountable realize that others (e.g., superiors or co-workers) can identify and evaluate 
their behaviors (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). More specifically, if performance in the team 
does not go well, the results can be linked to leaders personally. Thus, leaders with 
stronger external evaluation expectations are less likely to let others (e.g., followers) take 
all the blame when there are bad outcomes in teams.  
Second, evaluation expectations from others can increase leaders’ complexity of 
thinking (Tetlock, 1983). Because multiple stakeholders (e.g., subordinates and top 
managers) are involved in the evaluation process, a leader who expects that he/she is held 
accountable tends to not only consider his/her own benefits but also pay more attention to 
balance different stakeholders’ benefits. For example, leaders with stronger evaluation 
expectations from others are less self-focused and show more respect to the efforts of 
others (Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, Dardis, 2002). Therefore, leaders with strong external 
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expectations are less likely to claim rewards only for themselves when there are good 
outcomes. Taken together, external expectations reduce leaders’ self-benefitting 
accountability behaviors. Thus, I propose: 
Hypothesis 3: A leader’s external expectations are negatively related to his/her 
self-benefitting accountability.  
With that said, there is not sufficient evidence to show that external expectations 
may predict leaders’ other-benefitting accountability. When Tetlock (1985) proposed the 
role of evaluation expectations, he asserted that the pressure to justify one’s decisions to 
others could reduce individuals’ tendency to attribute other people’s dispositional traits as 
reasons for poor performance. In other words, the impetus to exert external expectations 
on leaders is to reduce their attribution errors associated with self-benefitting 
accountability. Accordingly, I argue that a leader’s external expectations are more 
relevant to leaders’ self-benefitting accountability, as compared to other-benefitting 
accountability. Moreover, leaders with other-benefitting accountability are by definition 
other-focused. They intrinsically accept the ownership of poor performance and let others 
take the credit for good performance. External factors such as evaluation expectations do 
not necessarily increase leaders’ other-focused behaviors. Instead, researchers have 
provided examples that leaders’ internal factors, such as their humility and personal 
values, play leading roles in explaining their other-oriented behaviors (e.g., Le, Fuller, 
Muriithi, & Walters, 2013). Thus, rather than hypothesizing the relationship between 
external expectations and other-benefitting accountability, I maintain it as a research 
question to be explored. 
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Leader Accountability and Followers’ Collective Accountability  
Social learning theory suggests that individuals can learn through observing and 
modeling (Bandura, 1977, 1986). In organizations, formal leaders are frequent social 
contacts whose actions are visible to followers. Formal leaders can exert influence on 
lower-level employees (Yukl, 2010). Thus, leaders’ behaviors become an effective source 
of observing and modeling. Because of their higher status, they are in control of 
important resources in teams, and followers rely more on leaders for behavioral guidance, 
as compared to other individuals in the team. Therefore, as compared to peers or people 
at a lower level hierarchy, leaders with higher status trigger more emulating behaviors 
from their subordinates. This process has also been referred to as the cascading effect in 
the leadership literature (Bass, 1990; Bass, Waldman, & Avolio, 1987). By observing and 
emulating the behaviors conveyed by leaders, individuals can get social cues about how 
to interpret and respond to the environment in the workplace, thus avoiding needless 
mistakes (Bandura, 1971).  
Researchers have shown that followers can imitate either positive or negative 
leadership behaviors (e.g., Liu et al., 2011; Mayer et al., 2009). Specifically, Mayer et al. 
(2009) found that ethical leadership could flow down to lower level employees’ ethical 
behaviors. Similarly, Liu et al. (2012) argued that negative leader behaviors such as 
abusive supervision would also flow down to lower-level employees’ abusive actions. 
However, previous research has not examined the influence of complex leader behaviors 
simultaneously. Smith and Lewis (2011) contended that leaders’ behaviors might include 
a complex blend of both positive and negative qualities. In addition, they suggested that 
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the same paradoxical tensions (e.g., self-interest and other-interest) could cascade across 
levels (Smith & Lewis, 2011). 
In the context of accountability, as a leader can be both self-benefitting and other-
benefitting in their accountability, followers’ emulating of self-benefitting and other-
benefitting behaviors may be parallel. Extending the current literature, which has 
typically only examined either the positive side or the negative side of leader behaviors, I 
explore the influencing roles of leaders’ self-benefitting and other-benefitting 
accountability behaviors simultaneously. I propose that leaders’ contradictory, yet 
interrelated, self-benefitting and other-benefitting accountability behaviors can both be 
learned by followers. Specifically, leaders’ self-benefitting accountability can lead to 
followers' collective self-benefitting accountability, while leaders' other-benefitting 
accountability results in followers' collective other-benefitting accountability.  
Social learning theory can help explain why leader accountability can result in 
two seemingly contradictory, forms of collective accountability: (1) self-benefitting 
accountability, and (2) other-benefitting accountability. Specifically, consistent with 
other leadership behaviors that can influence followers (e.g., Liu et al., 2012; Mayer et al., 
2009), leaders’ accountability behaviors are visible to employees. By virtue of their 
position, leaders serve as possible models of both accountability behaviors (i.e., self-
benefitting or other-benefitting accountability) to followers. By frequently observing 
leaders’ accountability behaviors, both self-benefitting and other-benefitting 
accountability behaviors can be learned by followers. For example, leaders who always 
take personal credit for good team performance, while blaming subordinates for team 
mistakes, will tend to have employees engaging in similar self-benefitting behaviors, 
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such as taking personal credit for achievement and blaming co-workers for mistakes. The 
more frequently leaders display self-benefitting accountability behaviors, the more likely 
followers learn to display self-benefitting accountability. Likewise, leaders who hold 
followers accountable for good team performance provide examples of other-benefitting 
behaviors that subordinates could emulate. Thus, employees are likely to learn to give 
others (e.g., leaders or peers) credit for positive performance, rather than taking credit 
themselves. In this way, employees also develop other-benefitting accountability 
behaviors overtime.  
Moreover, consistent with social learning theory, the social exchange theory of 
reciprocity (Blau, 1964) suggests that people respond to others in similar ways. 
Accountability behaviors displayed by leaders and followers involve exchange of rewards 
and punishment in teams. According to Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005), people can 
reciprocate based on what they get from others. Thus, followers reciprocate in relation to 
what they receive from leaders. There are positive and negative ways of reciprocity. A 
positive reciprocity is to return positive treatment for positive treatment, while a negative 
reciprocity is to return negative treatment for negative treatment (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 
2005). In the context of accountability, leaders with self-benefitting accountability 
(negative treatment to followers) receive negative reciprocity from followers. For 
example, if leaders reward themselves for good team performance and blame followers 
for bad team outcomes, followers may reciprocate negatively by also blaming leaders for 
team mistakes and taking personal credit for good team outcomes. In contrast, leaders 
who show other-benefitting accountability acknowledge followers for achievement, while 
blaming themselves for mistakes (positive treatment to followers). In return, followers 
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reciprocate positively by holding themselves accountable for mistakes and crediting 
leaders or co-workers for good team performance.  
In short, both social learning and social exchange theories would suggest a 
cascading of accountability, both self-benefitting and other-benefitting, from leaders to 
followers. Thus, I propose that:  
Hypothesis 4a: Leader self-benefitting accountability is positively related to 
collective self-benefitting accountability; 
Hypothesis 4b: Leader other-benefitting accountability is positively related to 
collective other-benefitting accountability.  
The Moderation Role of Leader Organization Prototypicality 
As argued above, followers could learn from their leaders and display similar 
accountable behaviors; this imitation process is parallel for both self-benefitting and 
other-benefitting accountability. However, accountability behaviors that are displayed by 
various leaders do not receive the same level of attention from followers. The motivation 
component of social learning indicates that certain characteristics of leaders may 
determine whether the learning process could be strengthened by altering people’s 
motivation to mimic (Bandura, 1977). One key leader characteristic that has been 
examined to distinguish leaders from one another regarding their influential effectiveness 
is leader organization prototypicality (van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). A leader is 
perceived as prototypical of an organization if he or she represents the organization’s 
collective goals and values (Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Hogg, 2001). Leader 
prototypicality is context-specific because different organizations may have alternative 
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values and norms; one prototypical leader may be considered as non-prototypical in 
another organization (van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003).  
The social identity model of leadership effectiveness (van Knippenberg & Hogg, 
2003) proposes that prototypical leaders’ behaviors provide information about specific in-
group norms and values, and these messages are more persuasive and influential if they 
come from more prototypical leaders (van Knippenberg, Lossie, &Wilke, 1994). That is, 
prototypical leaders are supported and trusted more by the members of the unit that they 
lead (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003). Moreover, if one leader is collectively endorsed 
as a prototypical leader, followers are more vulnerable to grant his/her behaviors as 
legitimate and more likely to internalize those behaviors (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). 
Leader prototypicality is more influential to followers because they represent unit norms 
and values (Ullrich, Christ, & van Dick, 2009). In addition, based on social identity 
theory, individuals in the workplace are motivated to be in-group members so that they 
might be able to get certain valuable and favorable consequences (van Knippenberg & 
Hogg, 2003). 
For example, being in-group members can enhance individuals’ perceptions of 
themselves (Hogg, 2003) and help build good relationships with other people within the 
larger collectives (Graen & Scandura, 1987). Driven by the motivation to be in-group 
members to get associated valuable resources and support, individuals tend to behave 
more consistently with more prototypical leaders who represent collective values and 
goals. Therefore, the social learning or imitation that occurs between leaders and 
followers could be strengthened/weakened by alternative levels of leader prototypicality. 
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Both self-benefitting and other-benefitting accountability behaviors can be 
displayed by prototypical leaders or non-prototypical leaders. When individuals 
encounter leaders’ self-benefitting and other-benefitting accountability behaviors, 
whether they are more motivated to follow/imitate or neglect certain types of behaviors 
depends on their perceptions of whether those leader behaviors represent the 
organization’s norms and values. That is, group members’ motivation to enhance/reduce 
their reproduction of leaders’ accountability behaviors depends on whether they perceive 
the leaders as prototypical of the organization. If the leader is considered as prototypical, 
his/her behaviors are considered to be benchmarks, and followers are more motivated to 
perceive him/her as a role model and do what the leader does. Given that followers are 
likely to want to be in line with the organization’s values and norms, they tend to model 
the most prototypical leaders’ behaviors (van Knippenberg, 2011). Therefore, in this 
study, I examine the contingent role of leader organization prototypicality in qualifying 
the trickle-down effect of leader accountability on followers’ accountability behaviors.    
Specifically, self-benefitting accountability behaviors that are displayed by a 
prototypical leader will receive more attention and be modeled more by followers than 
similar treatment by a non-prototypical leader (De Cremer, van Dijke, Mayer, 2010; 
Hogg, 2001). Self-benefitting accountability behaviors from a prototypical leader signal 
followers that these self-benefitting behaviors are representative of their organizational 
values. For example, a prototypical leader's self-benefitting accountability behaviors may 
imply that his or her organization emphasizes individual goal-achievement and self-
fulfillment. Being motivated to be consistent with this organization’s values and norms, 
followers will then tend to display more self-benefitting accountability behaviors.  
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In a similar vein, even though some prototypical leaders’ self-benefitting 
accountability behaviors may suggest concern only with regard to those leaders’ own 
benefits without concern for followers’ welfare, followers may perceive those behaviors 
are legitimate in the organization (Ullrich et al., 2009), and thus mimic the self-
benefitting behaviors. Consequently, followers may be more likely to absorb those self-
benefitting accountability behaviors (e.g., discipline others for bad outcomes and take 
personal credits for achievements) to be consistent with the organization’s instrumental 
values. In contrast, if a non-prototypical leader displays self-benefitting behaviors, 
followers may perceive that those accountability behaviors are not part of the 
organization’s values and norms. Thus, followers may not consider these behaviors as 
legitimate conduct in the organization and do not mimic the self-benefitting 
accountability of the leader.   
Similarly, other-benefitting accountability behaviors from a prototypical leader 
signal to followers that these behaviors characterize their organization’s values as 
altruistic and other-benefitting. Those individuals who rely on prototypical leaders for 
behavior guidance are more motivated to display similar behaviors by showing more 
concern for others and putting others’ interests before their own. In this way, group 
members tend to blame themselves first for the team’s mistakes and reward each other for 
achievements. In contrast, if a non-prototypical leader displays some other-benefitting 
accountability behaviors, followers might consider those behaviors as not representing 
organization values and have less motivation to imitate them. Even though the leader may 
bring some benefits to followers by blaming him/herself for mistakes and rewarding 
followers for achievement, followers consider those behaviors as illegitimate in this 
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organization and a violation of the organization’s norms and values. Therefore, they are 
less motivated to reproduce those other-benefitting behaviors. Thus, individuals may 
neglect or be unwilling to imitate what the non-prototypical leader presents. In sum, I 
propose the moderation role of leader prototypicality as follows:   
Hypothesis 5a: The positive relationship between leader self-benefitting 
accountability and collective self-benefitting accountability is strengthened when 
a leader is high in organization prototypicality, as compared to low in 
organization prototypicality.  
Hypothesis 5b: The positive relationship between leader other-benefitting 
accountability and collective other-benefitting accountability is strengthened 
when a leader is high in organization prototypicality, as compared to low in 
organization prototypicality.  
The Links between Collective Accountability and Team Outcomes 
Next, I consider the relationship between followers’ collective accountability and 
two aspects of team-level outcomes: team leaders’ own effectiveness and the overall 
effectiveness of teams. Leader effectiveness is about a leader’s individual performance, 
while team effectiveness is about the whole team (including the leader and followers)’s 
efficiency and performance. These two outcomes are related to each other. For instance, 
an effective leader may enhance the overall team effectiveness by coaching and 
supervising (Wageman, 2001), and team effectiveness may be part of the criteria to 
evaluate a leader’s own job performance. However, how two types of collective 
accountability relate to these two outcomes might be different, although the directions of 
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the relationships could be the same. Next, I will talk about the connection of collective 
accountability with leader and team effectiveness respectively.  
Leader effectiveness. Followers’ collect accountability relates the team leader’s 
effectiveness in two ways. On one hand, followers’ collective self-benefitting 
accountability may decrease the team leader’s effectiveness. If everyone in the team 
always blames others for mistakes when something goes poor and takes personal credits 
when something goes well, this team does not have a friendly environment and followers 
may not get along well with each other. This may also decrease the team leader’s 
effectiveness because the team leader may be perceived as a person who does not 
perform his/her duty to help build good relationships among followers and achieve higher 
outcomes. The leader may be perceived as incompetent in the eyes of others. On the other 
hand, followers’ collective other-benefitting may increase the leader’s effectiveness, 
especially in the eyes of others. If followers are giving others credits to each other’s 
efforts or admit personal mistakes, everyone in the team trusts each other and develops 
better relationships with each other. Thus, this leader may be perceived as an effective 
performer in building a cohesive team and play his/her role as a team leader (Morgeson, 
DeRue, & Karam, 2009). Thus, I propose that,  
Hypothesis 6a: Collective self-benefitting accountability is negatively related to 
leader effectiveness.  
Hypothesis 6b: Collective other-benefitting accountability is positively related to 
leader effectiveness.     
Team effectiveness. Previous literature has indicated that if accountability is 
shared among team members, it may get diffused and individuals feel less accountable 
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for team performance (e.g., Forsyth et al., 2002). For example, team members sharing 
collective accountability are less likely to make efforts to increase performance because 
they may not get personal recognition for good performance. Moreover, if things go 
wrong, members sharing collective accountability may not take personal ownership, but 
instead, blame each other for mistakes (Whyte, 1991). As a result, team effectiveness 
could be decreased because members do not feel motivated to contribute to the overall 
team effectiveness. However, previous research does not distinguish collective self-
benefitting accountability from collective other-benefitting accountability. Moreover, 
previous literature (e.g., Forsyth et al., 2002; Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 
2012) mostly emphasizes how collective self-benefitting accountability negatively relates 
to performance, while ignoring the potential positive relationship of collective other-
benefitting accountability.   
If members have collective other-benefitting accountability, the team result 
should be positive. For example, sharing collective other-benefitting accountability 
means that members blame themselves first rather than others when things go wrong. 
Thus, team members feel safe to take risks to improve team performance because 
members do not hold mistakes against each other (Edmondson, 1999). Moreover, every 
team member accounts for the mistakes that they make, rather than avoiding and rejecting 
the mistakes. By assuming personal ownership for poor performance, team members may 
collectively take action to make improvements, rather than ignoring problems or waiting 
for others to take action. In addition, in a team with high collective other-benefitting 
accountability, members are not likely to steal others’ credits; instead, they value each 
other’s inputs. They reinforce each other’s contributions to performance, and thus those 
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who make contributions are likely to get recognized. In this way, team members are 
inclined to exert more effort to achieve better group performance. As a result, high 
collective other-benefitting accountability can increase team effectiveness.   
In sum, at the team level, I argue that followers’ collective accountability relates 
to team effectiveness in two ways. On the one hand, as indicated in prior literature (e.g., 
Forsyth et al., 2002; Moore et al., 2012), collective self-benefitting accountability is 
negatively related to team effectiveness. On the other hand, as illustrated in the above 
arguments, followers’ collective other-benefitting accountability is positively related to 
team effectiveness. This is also consistent with shared leadership literature that if team 
members share a more negative form of leadership (e.g., shared aversive leadership), 
shared leadership would engender negative performance outcomes (Pearce & Sims, 
2002). If a positive form of leadership is shared (e.g., shared transformational leadership), 
shared leadership increases team effectiveness (Wang, Waldman, & Zhang, 2014). Thus, 
I propose that:  
Hypothesis 7a: Collective self-benefitting accountability is negatively related to 
team effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 7b: Collective other-benefitting accountability is positively related to 
team effectiveness.     
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
I conducted two studies to develop a new measure of leader accountability (based 
on multiple samples) and to test the hypotheses in my theoretical model of leader 
accountability. Study 1 was used to develop and validate the measures with multiple 
samples. In study 2, I tested the hypotheses with a separate sample of employees and 
supervisors.  
Study 1: Leader Accountability Scale Development and Validation 
To develop a new measure of leader accountability, I applied a three-phase 
approach that was originally developed by Hinkin (1998). At phase 1, I generated items 
based on my definition of leader accountability. At phase 2, I assessed the basic 
psychometric properties of the accountability scale through exploratory factor analysis 
based on an undergraduate student sample. At phase 3, I conducted confirmatory factor 
analysis and examined the scale’s discriminant validity with people with more work 
experience.  
Phase 1: Item Development  
First, based on the existing scales from Hall (2005) and Wood and Winston (2005) 
and the theoretical discussions about accountability (e.g., Wood & Winston, 2005), I 
generated 55 items of accountability using a deductive approach. I then invited 6 business 
experts who are higher-level leaders in their companies to describe what they considered 
as accountability through in-depth face-to-face interviews (The interview protocol is in 
Appendix A). Five of them were male, ranging from 35-55 years old. They were from 
various industries including banking, venture capital, and technology services. Informants 
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talked about ownership of team performance such as “I blame myself first if something 
goes wrong”, and “I got your back!” Based on their comments, I eliminated a total of 30 
items (28 items about external expectations, and two items with overlapped meanings) to 
improve the clarity of the accountability measure. This process yielded a total of 25 items.  
Next, I invited 45 senior management undergraduate students to sort each item 
into one of the four categories of accountability (based on Table 1) (Schriesheim, Powers, 
Scandura, Gardiner, & Lankau, 1993). Research has indicated that undergraduate 
students could be used for content validity purposes (Colquitt, Baer, Long, & Halvorsen-
Ganepola, 2014; Schriesheim et al., 1993). Items could fall into none of those categories. 
If more than 75% of the judges correctly categorized the items into their respective 
dimensions (Hinkin, 1998), those items were retained. A total of 17 items were kept in 
this process. A list of these items is provided in Table 3.  
Phase 2: Scale Refinement through Exploratory Factor Analysis  
The purpose of the EFA was to explore the factor structure of the accountability 
construct. This sample comprised 183 students from 6 undergraduate business classes (a 
potential total of 255 students in the pool) at a large southwest university (with response 
rate of 71.8%). Most of the students were junior and senior students majoring in business. 
These students participated voluntarily in the on-line survey, which included a drawing to 
get gift cards. I asked them to think about a leader with whom they have had contact in 
recent times. They rated the level of agreement in terms of the 17 items accountability 
when thinking of their leaders, from 1 = ‘‘strongly disagree’’ to 7 = ‘‘strongly agree’’. 
Responses were excluded from analyses when students did not have any work experience 
(full time or part time), although they were asked to rate a sports or business leader that 
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they knew from the media. The final sample for the EFA analysis was 160. Because the 
EFA data followed normal distribution, Maximum likelihood and an oblique rotation 
(direct oblimin) to allow correlations among factors were conducted (Fabrigar, Wegener, 
MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999; Costello & Osborne, 2005). I did not specify the number 
of factors, but determined the factors based on Eigen values (i.e., with Eigen values larger 
than 1).   
This EFA yields four factors (as shown at Table 3), which explains 69.84% of the 
variance. I kept items with loadings larger than .40 in Table 4. Item 6 with a lower 
than .40 loading was deleted (i.e., the loading of item 6 is .35). All of the other 16 items 
were kept because they did not have low loadings or cross-loadings on multiple factors. 
The findings indicate a four-factor structure of leader accountability (i.e., internal 
attribution for good performance, internal attribution for bad performance, external 
attribution for good performance, and external attribution for bad performance), with four 
items in each factor, which is consistent with what have been proposed in Table 1.   
Phase 2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Discriminant Validity 
Confirmatory factor analysis. I conducted confirmatory factor analyses to refine 
the measure of leader accountability. A sample of 230 people participated in this study. I 
included 222 individuals who had work experience, including 49 employees from 
companies, 102 MBA students (20 full-time MBA and 82 on-line MBA), and 71 
undergraduate students. The survey was conducted on-line through Qualtrics. I asked the 
participants to think about a leader with whom they have had contact in recent times. 
Each individual evaluated his or her leader’s accountability, as well as ethical leadership 
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and humility. All measures (see Appendix B) were obtained on a 7-point Likert scale 
with 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree”. 
As shown in Table 4, I specified alternative models. Specifically, I specified items 
loading on a four-factor structure (model 1), two three-factor structure (models 2 and 3), 
one two-factor structure with self-benefitting and other-benefitting accountability (model 
4), as well a one-factor accountability model (model 5), and checked the model fit indices 
(Bollen, 1989). In addition, I included a second-order factor model (model 6, self-
benefitting and other-benefitting as two second-order factors with two first-order factors 
respectively), as well a one-factor model with accountability as one higher-order model 
(model 7, one second-order factor with four first-order factors), to see which model was 
better. Based on Hu and Bentler (1998), I selected the root-mean-square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI) and standardized root mean square 
residual (SRMR) as fit indices. Cut-off values of 0.05 for RMSEA, 0.90 for CFI, and .08 
for SRMR were applied (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The results show that model 1 (four-factor 
model) and model 6 (two higher-order factor model) fit better than all the other models. I 
chose model 6 over model 1 in my next step, as both the hierarchical model (model 6) 
and four-factor model fit the data well, but model 6 fits better with my theory of two 
higher-order constructs of accountability (Judge, LePine, & Rich, 2006).   
Discriminant validity. To assess the convergent and discriminant validity of 
leader accountability, I examined the degree to which leader accountability differed from 
other constructs (Bagozzi, Li, & Phillips, 1991). Variables were collected in the same 
survey from the group of 222 people in the CFA.  
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Leader self- and other-benefitting accountability. I used the 16 items that were 
developed from the exploratory factor analysis, with 8-items for self-benefitting and 8 
items for other-benefitting accountability. The Cronbach’s alpha of self-benefitting and 
other-benefitting accountability are .92 and .90 respectively.   
Ethical leadership. Ethical leadership was measured with 10 items from Brown et 
al. (2005). A sample item is “This person conducts his/her personal life in an ethical 
manner”. Cronbach’s alpha is .95.  
Humility. I used the 9-item measure from Owens et al. (2013). An example item 
is “This person actively seeks feedback, even if it is critical.” Cronbach’s alpha is .96.  
Discriminant validity of the accountability measure versus other related 
measures. I ran a four-factor model with self-benefitting and other-benefitting as two 
second order factors, and ethical leadership and humility as two separate factors as the 
baseline model (Model 1 in Table 5, with four items for each first-order factor of 
accountability and two first-order factors for each second-order factor of accountability, 
10 items for ethical leadership, and 9 items for humility). I used MLR (maximum 
likelihood estimates with robust standard errors to correct for non-normality, Chou, 
Bentler, & Satorra, 1991; Yuan & Bentler, 2000) in the model comparisons, because the 
ethical leadership variable is not normally distributed (items have skewness value larger 
than the absolute value of 1). The baseline model has good model fit: CFI = 0.91, TLI = 
0.90 and RMSEA = 0.07, SRMR= .05. As shown in Table 5, the baseline model with 
three factors represents the best fitting model, as compared with the other four three-
factor models. Results demonstrate that each accountability factor is distinct from other 
similar constructs and should not be combined with other constructs.  
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Study 2: Model Testing Study 
Sample and Data Collection 
Because this study was conducted in China, I translated the surveys into Chinese 
following the translation-back translation procedures (Brislin, 1980). Two people 
involved in the translation process were both native Chinese speakers with solid 
backgrounds in English. One person translated all the items into Chinese using practical 
language for the audience in the companies. The other person then translated the items 
back into English. Discrepancies were discussed with me until a satisfactory result was 
reached.  
 To avoid common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), 
I collected data from multiple sources at multiple times using paper and pencil surveys. 
All participants were asked to provide the last four digits of work phone numbers to 
match their data over time. In addition, followers were also asked to provide the last four 
digits of their direct supervisors’ work phone numbers to identity their group membership. 
I asked one higher-level manager from each company to fill out the outcomes variables 
for middle level managers in their own companies. Participants read the consent letter 
before they started the survey. The confidentiality and purposes of the research were 
clearly stated in the consent form. At time 1, I asked followers to evaluate their leaders’ 
humility, and leaders rated their own external expectations. At time 2 (two weeks later), I 
asked followers to rate their leaders’ accountability. At time 3 (another two weeks later), 
I asked followers to rate their team members’ collective accountability and their leaders’ 
prototypicality. Leader and team effectiveness measures were obtained from higher-level 
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managers two weeks afterwards. All response options ranged from (1) ‘‘strongly 
disagree’’ to (7) ‘‘strongly agree’’.   
I collected data from three companies in China: (1) a beauty-salon chain store 
(multiple stores in the chain), (2) a non-profit public service organization, and (3) the 
head office of a health insurance company. A total of 60 leaders and their followers were 
invited to participate voluntarily. Fifty-seven of them completed the surveys. Higher-
level managers evaluated those who completed the surveys. On average, the middle level 
managers are 38.2 years old, working in their company for 11 years. 57.4% are male, 66% 
of them have some college education or above. There are 174 followers who were invited 
to participate, 162 of them responded in this sample, including 54.1% males, 80.9% have 
college degree and above. The average age is 34.1 years old.  
Measures (see Appendix B for details) 
Humility. The same measure from study 1 was used in study 2. Cronbach’s alpha 
is .95.  
External expectations. I used the items from Hochwarter, Kacmar & Ferris 
(2003) about leaders’ perceived external expectations. A sample item is “If things at work 
do not go the way that they should, I will hear about it from top management.”  The 
Cronbach's alpha is .79.  
Leader self- and other- benefitting accountability. The 16-item scale of 
accountability from study 1 were used in this study. Eight items were used for self-
benefitting, and 8-items were used for other-benefitting, accountability. The reliability for 
self-benefitting accountability is .87, and .91 for other-benefitting accountability.  
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Leader organization prototypicality. I used five items from van Knippenberg & 
van Knippenberg (2005). An example item is “This person is a good example of the kind 
of people in our organization.” The Cronbach's alpha of this variable is .89.   
Collective self- and other-benefitting accountability. I used the items 
developed for leader accountability and changed the referent from “a leader” to “team 
members as a whole”. All of the scores were aggregated to the group level. A sample 
item is “Team members hold themselves responsible for the team’s performance.” The 
alpha is .82 for both types of collective accountability.   
Team outcomes. Two outcomes measures were used: (1) leader effectiveness, 
and (2) team effectiveness. I asked higher-level superiors to rate leader effectiveness for 
each team that he/she supervised, using a 4-item measure adapted from Nahrgang, 
Morgeson, & Ilies (2009). A sample item of leader effectiveness is “This manager 
performs very well”. The Cronbach’s alpha was .91 for leader effectiveness. The higher-
level superiors also rated each team’s overall team effectiveness, with measures adapted 
from Edmonson (1999)’s 4-item team effectiveness measure. A sample item is “This 
team keeps getting better and better”. The Cronbach’s alpha was .73. To distinguish these 
two outcome variables, I did a discriminant validity test. Due to the sample size limit, I 
randomly combined two items in each variable and created one parcel for leader 
effectiveness and team effectiveness (Little, Rhemtulla, Gibson, & Schoemann, 2013), so 
each construct has three indicators (one parcel and two items). The model with two 
distinct outcome constructs has a better fit (χ2 (8) = 14.36, CFI =0.96; TLI = 0.93, 
RMSEA = 0.12, and SRMR=. 05), as compared to the model with one construct (χ2 (9) = 
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33.20, CFI =0.85; TLI = 0.75, RMSEA = 0.23, and SRMR=. 07, ∆df = 1, ∆χ2 =18.84, p 
< .01).    
Control variables. Because humility is related to collective self and other 
benefitting accountability, I controlled for the main effects of leader humility in 
predicting outcomes.    
Analyses  
Discriminant validity of follower-rated constructs. To examine the 
distinctiveness of my constructs, I did an omnibus confirmatory factor analysis with all 
the follower-rated variables in my model. I had six variables that were rated by followers, 
including leader humility (9 items), leader self- and other-benefitting accountability (16 
items), leader prototypicality (5 items), and collective self- and other-benefitting 
accountability (16 items). I used the six-factor model as the baseline model and compared 
the other 15 models (combing any of the two factors) with the baseline model. Due to the 
limit of my sample size at the follower level, I created three parcels (Little et al., 2013) 
for the 9-item leader humility based on internal dimensional structure shown in Owen et 
al. (2013), and two parcels for leader prototypicality (5 items combined by random with 
2-item and 3-item for two parcels). Moreover, based on my conceptualization of 
accountability in Table 1, I created two observed components for each accountability 
construct (e.g., 8 items for “internal attribution of poor performance” and for “external 
attribution of good performance” were averaged to represent other-benefitting 
accountability). Table 6 shows the statistical results of the models. The baseline model 
with six distinctive factors had satisfactory fit: χ2 (50) = 80.11, CFI =0.97; TLI = 0.95, 
RMSEA = 0.06, and SRMR=. 05, and are significantly better than other models in terms 
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of model fit, which supported the distinctiveness of follower-rated constructs in my 
model.  
Aggregation statistics. Data aggregation statistics were evaluated before I 
aggregated the follower-rated variables: leader humility, leader accountability, leader 
organization prototypicality, and collective accountability. As shown in Table 7, the 
median Rwg(j)s for all the follower-rated variables are larger than .90, with significant F-
tests and relatively high ICC(1) values (Bliese, 2000; James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984). 
The aggregation statistics provided support for aggregating follower ratings to the leader 
level.    
Analytical strategy. I used Mplus 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 2014) to test 
hypotheses with single-level path modeling. Because the leaders and their teams are 
nested within higher-level leaders who rated the team outcomes, I used the MLR 
estimator (maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors) with clusters 
(type=complex) to adjust the standard errors of clustering under higher-level leaders 
(Asparouhov, & Muthén, 2006).   
Hypothesis Testing 
Means and standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities are shown in Table 8. 
To assess each hypothesis, I examined the overall model fit indices and the significance 
and direction of each path coefficient. The path model with all the main effects has 
acceptable fit: χ2 (11) = 14.15; CFI =0.98; TLI = 0.94; RMSEA = 0.07, SRMR=. 08. To 
test hypothesis 1-2, I used leader humility to predict leader self-benefitting and other-
benefitting accountability. As shown in Figure 2, leader humility is not significantly 
related to leader self-benefitting accountability. Hypothesis 1 is not supported. However, 
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leader humility is positively related to leader other-benefitting accountability (β = 0.44, 
p< 0.01). Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
To test hypothesis 3, I used leader external expectations to predict leader other-
benefitting accountability. External expectations is not related to leader self-benefitting 
accountability; hypothesis 3 was not supported.  Moreover, I added one more path from 
external expectation to predict leader other-benefitting accountability to answer the 
research question I proposed. The mode fit becomes worse (χ2 (10) = 15.16; CFI =0.97; 
TLI = 0.89; RMSEA = 0.10, SRMR =. 08; ∆df = 1, ∆χ2 = 0.174, p > .10), and the more 
parsimonious model without this additional path was chosen. In addition, external 
expectations is not significantly related to leader other-benefitting accountability, 
although the simple correlation indicated a potential positive relationship between the 
two (r = 0.18, p > 0.10).  
As shown in Figure 2, leader self-benefitting accountability is related to collective 
self-benefitting accountability (β = 0. 62, p< 0.01) and leader other-benefitting 
accountability is related to collective other-benefitting accountability (β = 0.40, p< 0.05). 
Thus, hypothesis 4 is supported. Collective self-benefitting is negatively related to leader 
effectiveness (β = -0.49, p < 0.01) and collective other-benefitting accountability is 
positively related to leader effectiveness (β = 0.64, p < 0.01). Thus, hypothesis 6a and 6b 
are supported.  Collective self-benefitting is negatively related to leader effectiveness (β 
= -0.18, p < 0.05) and collective other-benefitting accountability is positively related to 
leader effectiveness (β = 0.26, p > 0.10). Thus, hypothesis 7a is supported, while 
hypothesis 7b is not supported.  
Hypothesis 5 was tested by first centering the two leader accountability variables 
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and leader organization prototypicality, then creating two interaction terms in the path 
model. The model with the interaction terms also has acceptable fit: χ2 (11) = 14.74; CFI 
=0.96; TLI = 0.88; RMSEA = 0.07, SRMR=. 05. Leader organization prototypicality 
moderates the relationship between collective self-benefitting accountability and 
collective self-benefitting accountability (β = 0.29, p < 0.05). I also tested the simple 
slopes of the interaction. When the leader has high organization prototypicality, leader 
self-benefitting accountability is more related to collective self-benefitting accountability 
(β = 0.77, p < 0.01); while this relationship is less positive when the leader has low 
organization prototypicality (β = 0.25, p < 0.01). The difference between the two 
condition is also significant (β = 0.52, p < 0.05). The simple slope plot is shown in Figure 
3. In contrast, leader organization prototypicality does not moderate the relationship 
between leader self-benefitting accountability and collective self-benefitting 
accountability. Therefore, hypothesis 5a is supported, while hypothesis 5b is not 
supported.   
Post Hoc Analysis for External Expectation 
To further explore the research question about the relationship between external 
expectation and leader other-benefitting accountability, I did a post-hoc analysis to see 
whether there is a curvilinear relationship. I added a quadratic term of external 
expectation (after centering), along with the linear term of external expectation to predict 
leader other-benefitting accountability. Although the signs of the coefficients indicates an 
inverted-U shaped relationship (the quadratic term is -.13 and the linear term is .10), the 
p-value of the quadratic term is not significant.  
Post Hoc Analysis for Indirect Effects  
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I further examined some mediation mechanisms and moderated mediation effects 
using 10,000 times bootstrapping (without cluster correction). As shown in Table 9, the 
mediation tests of the main effects were tested from path 1 to path 6. As shown, the 
connection between humility to leader effectiveness via leader and collective self-
benefitting is marginally significant (path 1, 95% CI is -.00 to .26; 90% CI is .00 to .21), 
while the connection via leader and collective other-benefitting was significant (path 3, 
95% CI is .02 to .42). Collective self-benefitting accountability is a significant mediator 
in the relationship between leader self-benefitting accountability and leader effectiveness 
(path 2, 95% CI is -.65 to -.04), while collective other-benefitting accountability is a 
significant mediator to the relationship between leader other-benefitting accountability 
and leader effectiveness (path 4, 95% CI is .03 to .83). The connection between humility 
to team effectiveness via leader and collective self-benefitting is not significant (path 5, 
95% CI is -.42 to .22), and collective self-benefitting accountability is not a significant 
mediator to the relationship between leader self-benefitting accountability and team 
effectiveness (path 6, 95% CI is -.02 to .18).  
Moreover, the moderated mediation effects under high and low leader 
organization prototypicality via self-benefitting accountability were tested from path 7 to 
path 10 (see Table 10). Leader organization prototypicality is a marginally significant 
moderator to the relationship between leader self-benefitting accountability and leader 
effectiveness via collective self-benefitting accountability (path 7, 95% CI of the 
difference test is -.97 to .03; 90% CI of the difference test is -.84 to -.01), while leader 
organization prototypicality is a marginally significant moderator to the relationship 
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between humility and leader effectiveness via leader and collective self-benefitting (path 
8, 95% CI of the difference test is -.01 to .33; 90% CI of the difference test is .00 to .26).  
Leader organization prototypicality is not a significant moderator to the 
relationship between leader self-benefitting accountability and team effectiveness via 
collective self-benefitting accountability (path 9, 95% CI of the difference test is -.66 
to .08), while leader organization prototypicality is a marginally significant moderator to 
the relationship between humility and team effectiveness via leader and collective self-
benefitting (path 10, 95% CI of the difference test is -.01 to .21). 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
My dissertation focused on the role of accountability in teams. First, I proposed 
an alternative definition of accountability, which was largely not considered in previous 
accountability literature. Second, I examined antecedents of leader accountability by 
connecting the existing, expectation-based accountability construct and leader humility 
with ownership-based accountability. Third, I studied how accountability could be 
transmitted from leaders to followers. That is, leader accountability may lead to collective 
accountability. Lastly, I examined how collective accountability could be associated with 
team outcomes. 
Summary of Results 
Ownership-based accountability as a new construct. This study introduced an 
ownership-based accountability to study leader and follower actions. The scale 
development and model testing studies supported the strong construct validity of this type 
of accountability. In addition, the two aspects of individual accountability, self-
benefitting and other-benefitting, are not two ends of the same continuum. Instead, 
although they are negatively correlated, they nevertheless can coexist as distinctive 
constructs. The results show that the negative correlations between two aspects of leader 
accountability and collective accountability are at a moderate level. The main study with 
middle level managers and their followers supported most of the hypotheses by 
considering self-benefitting and other-benefitting accountability as distinctive constructs. 
Future research may examine the joint effects of these two aspects of accountability.  
Predictors of leader accountability. This study discussed two different 
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predictors of leader accountability: leader humility and leader external expectations. The 
results suggested that humility is a significant predictor of leader other-benefitting 
accountability. Humble leaders who think more of others will be more likely to take 
accountability actions that benefit others. However, the post hoc analysis only found 
marginal support for humility as an independent variable linking leader and collect 
accountability to effectiveness. This may due to the multiple theoretical and empirical 
linkages separating humility from effectiveness. The role of leader humility as a distal 
predictor of team outcomes further confirms what Ou, Waldman, and Peterson (2015) has 
suggested in their article. In addition, besides humility, future research may examine 
other individual characteristics, such as one’s moral values in relation to accountability.    
 However, external expectation has no relationship with either type of 
accountability. That may indicate that external accountability does not necessarily lead to 
leaders’ ownership of team performance. Having external expectations on leaders may 
not motivate their ownership of performance. Moreover, there may be several reasons for 
the insignificant linear results. For example, some items of the external expectation 
measure do not really reflect external expectations about accountability (e.g., in the grand 
scheme of things, my efforts at work are very important). In addition, although the 
definition of external expectation includes potential rewards and punishments, the items 
are not tied into any rewards and punishments, so they do not reflect the real levels of 
external expectations about potential rewards and punishments. Future research may 
develop a more refined measure of external evaluation expectation.  
The post hoc analysis revealed a potential inverted U-shape relationship between 
external expectations and leader other-benefitting accountability. That is, an intermediate 
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level of external expectation may motivate leaders to display high leader other-
benefitting accountability. Too much or too little external expectations may decrease 
leaders’ other-benefitting accountability. Pokorny (2008) has suggested that paying too 
much or too little may both decrease the amount of efforts. Similarly, having too much 
expectations on leaders may also decrease their motivations to behave in an other-
benefitting way, while imposing too little expectation may not be enough to direct leaders’ 
actions. Future research may examine mechanisms through which external expectation 
links to accountability. For example, external expectations about rewards and 
punishments may influence individuals’ accountability by altering their distributive 
justice perceptions (Castilla, 2015). In addition, future research may consider the 
influence of culture and norms in relation to external expectations. That is, people may 
have different expectations towards leaders under alternative organizational cultures or 
industry norms.      
Leader Accountability to Collective Accountability  
I found that followers might model both other-benefitting and self-benefitting 
accountability behaviors from leaders. Future research might study the detailed 
mechanisms through which leader accountability relates to collective accountability. For 
example, followers may experience more procedural justice if their leader displays more 
other-benefitting accountability, and high procedural justice perceptions may increase 
followers’ own other-benefitting accountability behaviors. In addition, the ways or 
mechanisms through which self-benefitting and other-benefitting accountability influence 
outcomes may differ, and thus, future research might examine these potentially different 
mechanisms.     
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Moreover, the learning process of self-benefitting accountability can be enhanced 
when leaders have high organization prototypicality. That is, when a leader represents the 
organization’s values and is a good example of the kind of people in this organization, 
he/she is highly trusted by people in the same organization (Giessner, Van Knippenberg, 
& Sleebos, 2009). Therefore, his/her self-benefitting accountability could especially lead 
to higher collective self-benefitting accountability by followers. If this leader does not 
represent what the organization stands for (i.e., low organization prototypicality), then 
his/her self-benefitting accountability actions will be less imitated by followers. This 
suggests that organization prototypicality may serve as a legitimacy for followers to learn 
leaders’ self-benefitting actions and behave similarly. In contrast, leaders’ organization 
prototypicality did not moderate the other-benefitting accountability relationship. That is, 
as long as leaders are displaying other-benefitting accountability actions, even if they do 
not represent the organizations’ values, their actions will still be recognized and learned 
by followers. This indicates that the other-benefitting accountability may act as a 
substitute for organization prototypicality because it largely serves the followers’ 
interests. Followers do not need the legitimacy from prototypicality to imitate other-
benefitting accountability. Future research may examine other possible moderators that 
may alter the social learning process.  
Collective Accountability to Team Outcomes   
The relationships between collective accountability and team outcomes are 
different. Collective other-benefitting accountability can increase leader effectiveness, 
while collective self-benefitting accountability may decrease leader effectiveness. This 
indicates that leader effectiveness, as perceived by higher-level managers, may be largely 
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determined by how leaders encourage team members to take accountability. If leaders 
themselves behave based on their self-interests and have self-benefitting accountability, 
followers may behave in the same way. This may hurt leaders’ own effectiveness as 
perceived by higher level managers. In contrast, if leaders display other-benefitting 
accountability, this may not only motivate followers, but also increase leaders’ own 
performance in the eyes of higher level managers. Accordingly, leaders may need to 
encourage collective accountability in teams to increase their own effectiveness.  
However, I found support for the negative relationship between collective self-
benefitting accountability and team effectiveness, but no significant positive relationship 
between collective other-benefitting accountability and team effectiveness. This may 
indicate that if follower all behave based on their self-interests and have self-benefitting 
accountability, the overall team effectiveness may suffer. Because members do not care 
about other people’s efforts and benefits in this team and have little motivation to 
contribute to the overall team performance. However, the relationship between collective 
other-benefitting accountability and team effectiveness may deserve more future research. 
It is possible that there are other mechanisms that connect the relationship between 
collective other-benefitting accountability and team effectiveness. Additional research 
can address these linkages between collective accountability and team effectiveness.  
Theoretical Implications    
Leadership theory. This study contributes significantly to the leadership 
literature by introducing an underexplored component of leader characteristics---an 
ownership-based accountability. Recent leadership theories (e.g., empowering leadership, 
servant leadership, Hu & Liden, 2011; Ou et al., 2014) have encouraged leaders to let 
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followers take more responsibilities to handle tasks, and to motivate followers to become 
informal leaders (Wang et al., 2014). Formal leaders may play supporting roles rather 
than dominating the whole team process. However, the question of who will take the final 
accountability for related team outcomes is not clear. For example, if followers are 
empowered and they do not do well, does that mean followers are completely 
accountable for the bad results that they produce, and their leader is not accountable? 
Given the cascading effect of accountability, this study suggests that it is important for 
team leaders to take the ultimate ownership of the team results; no matter which follower 
is taking charge of executing the relevant tasks. Additional research is needed to explore 
how empowering leadership and leader accountability work together to generate better 
team outcomes.   
This study also contributes to the social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001; 
Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003) by examining the role of leader prototypicality in 
adjusting followers’ behaviors. The findings suggest that organization prototypicality 
may not always be positive because it may induce more self-benefitting accountability 
behaviors from followers. This is similar to what previous has suggested that 
prototypicality may provide a license for leaders to be ineffective or unfair (Giessner et 
al., 2009; Ullrich, Christ, & van Dick, 2009). Future research may examine how to reduce 
the negative role of leader organization prototypicality, for instance, by building other-
oriented organization values.   
Attribution theory. By examining the connections between leader and collective 
accountability, this research also contributes to the attribution theory by applying the 
attribution theory at not only the individual level, but also collective level. Moreover, 
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researchers (e.g., Harvey et al., 2014) have indicated that it is important to reveal what 
factors may contribute to members in a team to blame themselves for mistakes or take 
personal credits. This study provides one explanation of followers’ accountability 
actions—followers may learn from their leaders’ accountability actions. Future research 
may study other factors that relate to followers’ collective accountability. Nevertheless, 
this study focused on followers’ collective accountability, under the assumption that all 
members have a consensus on the team’s overall accountability. However, team members 
may not always display similar types of accountability actions. It is possible that some 
members may have more self-benefitting accountability, while others may display more 
other-benefitting accountability. Future research can address this concern by examining 
when team members have disagreement on team’s accountability actions, and then 
determine how this disagreement may associate with team processes.    
Work relationship theory. This study also contributes to the work relationship 
literature by examining how to build better leader-follower and follower-follower 
relationships through accountability. People in a team are connected not only by trust or 
respect, but also by the accountability actions they take (Ferris et al., 2009). Whether 
leaders take ownership of team outcomes may connect their relationships with their 
followers.  In addition, how team members take ownership of the overall team outcomes 
may influence their relationships with each other. Future research may integrate 
ownership-based accountability into work relationship literature by incorporating 
accountability to study broader types of relationship such as stakeholder-employee 
relationships. In addition, how accountability relationships may relate to other types of 
relationships such as trust and loyalty also deserves more research.   
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Limitations  
This study has several limitations. First, although I tried to have multiple ratings 
across time and from different sources, it is still difficult to make causal arguments. Some 
experimental research is needed in order to make more definitive statements regarding 
causal relationships. In addition, leader accountability and collective accountability are 
from the same source, although I measured those variables two weeks apart, thus 
lessening concerns regarding single-source biases (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Future 
research may replicate the findings by measuring those variables from different sources 
(e.g., peers and followers).   
Second, there are some limitations with my samples. Although the scale 
validation samples were all in the U.S., the model-testing sample was collected in China, 
which could have affected some of the findings. For example, the collectivist nature of 
China could help explain how collective (or team) accountability fully mediated the 
relationship between leader accountability and leader effectiveness. In a more 
individualistic culture, one might expect partial mediation, whereby the direct effect of 
leader accountability on leader effectiveness remains significant, even after controlling 
collective (or team) accountability. Thus, future research might include U.S. data 
collection to help compare and generalize the findings. Moreover, the model testing 
sample consists of 57 middle-level managers from three organizations. Future research 
might examine leaders and teams at other levels (e.g., CEOs and top management teams), 
as well as other types of organizations and industries.   
Third, my study did not address the detailed mechanisms through which leader 
accountability relates to collective accountability, other than the moderating effects of 
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leader organization prototypicality. Future research may try to explore why leader 
accountability may increase collective accountability via other mechanisms. Moreover, 
this study focused on limited team-level outcomes – specifically, leader and team 
effectiveness, as perceived by the higher-level managers. Future research might study 
other outcomes such as team cohesion as perceived by team members, objectively 
measured leader and team outcomes, and individual-level outcomes such as job 
satisfaction and turnover.   
Managerial Implications  
The current study has several essential implications for managers and 
organizations. First, scholars have promoted to impose high expectations on leaders for 
them to succeed (Hall, Frink, & Buckley, in press). However, this high expectation may 
not be effective, because it may not motivate leaders to take internal accountability for 
bad performance and external accountability for good performance. Moreover, based on 
the post hoc analysis on external expectations, there can be diminishing, or no returns by 
building very strong external expectations of accountability in the company. Building an 
intermediate level of external expectation may be more effective to promote 
accountability. Because external expectation is largely based on an organization’s 
performance appraisal system, having an intermediate level of punishment policies or 
incentive plans may be more effective.  
The findings related to ownership-based accountability provide new directions to 
how to develop leaders in the organization. Because managers need to hold themselves 
accountable, or assume ownership, to be effective, organizations should have leadership 
development programs to emphasize the ownership of their performance. Higher-level 
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managers should select/promote more accountable leaders or provide accountability-
related trainings to increase other-benefitting accountability and reduce self-benefitting 
accountability among managers.  
The current study also provides new insights about how to develop collective 
accountability among employees. Role modeling is an important source to develop 
collective accountability on the part of followers. By developing accountable managers, 
organizations can also increase the collective accountability among followers and form 
an accountability culture in teams. Moreover, building organizational values that are 
consistent with accountability is also important. If an organization has a culture that is 
self-interest oriented, managers who display self-benefitting accountability actions will 
be considered as more prototypical by followers. This may increase followers’ tendencies 
to blame others for mistakes and take personal credits for good performance. These 
actions are detrimental to the subsequent organization performance.  
Conclusion 
I examined the ownership-based accountability and its two interdependent 
components: (1) self-benefitting, and (2) other-benefitting accountability. I integrated 
attribution and social learning theories to explore the connection between leader 
accountability and follower accountability in teams. My study showed that humility is a 
predictor of other-benefitting accountability, and external expectations is not linearly 
related to either component of accountability. My study also reveals that leader 
accountability is associated with followers’ collective accountability, which further 
predicts team outcomes. In addition, the relationship of self-benefitting accountability to 
collective self-benefitting accountability is stronger when there are high prototypical 
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leaders who exhibit those self-benefitting actions. I hope that this study can stimulate 
more interest in examining accountability from an ownership perspective, and more 
research on exploring the role of this ownership-based accountability in organizations. 
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Initial Open-ended Questions 
1. Could you tell me about what your role is about as a leader? 
2. Could you tell me about your team and how you work together?  
Intermediate Questions 
1. Do you know a saying “the buck stops here” by U.S. president Harry S. Truman?  
2. [If you do], what do you think this sentence means? Do you believe that? 
3. Why do you think we need leader accountability in organizations?  
4. What will happen if leaders don’t have accountability?  
5. Have you faced accountability issues?  
6. [If so], to whom should you be accountable for as a leader? (Superiors, followers, 
customers or communities?)  
7. What do you mean by being accountable for your superior/followers or customers? 
8. How does leader accountability manifest in your entity?  
9. How do you think leader accountability should manifest in your organization?  
10. What factors might you take into consider when you judge accountabilities?   
11. Do your employees have any excuses for the wrong doing behaviors which lead 
to group failure?  
12. Did you team ever experience any outcomes that were worse than expected?  
13. [If so], what was it like? What did you think then? Who was held accountable for 
that?  
14. Did you team ever experience any outcomes that were better than expected?  
15. [If so], what was it like? What did you think then? Who was held accountable for 
that?  
16. How to judge whether a person is held accountable for your group performance? 
17. Who should take accountability if the cause of the outcome is directly pointed to a 
person (such as a follower of yours)?  
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Leader Accountability Scale Validation Survey (EFA Survey) 
          
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither Agree 
or Disagree 
Slightl
y agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Other-rating Items  
Please think of a leader with whom you have had contact in recent times.  
Next, you will see questions that describe an individual’s actions. For each item, please 
rate your level of agreement when thinking of this leader you have mentioned above. 
When you see “his/her team”, think about the team that the leader supervises, which 
may include you and his/her other subordinates. 
 Leader accountability (17 items) includes: 
1. This person looks to himself/herself first when his/her team’s results are 
disappointing 
2. When performance in this person team does not go favorably, he/she holds him or 
herself to account, for example, by receiving disciplinary actions. 
3. When performance in this person team does not go favorably, he/she identifies 
him/herself as the reason.   
4. This person apologizes to constituents (e.g., superiors, followers or customers) for 
his/her team’s mistakes. 
5. When performance in this person team does not go favorably, he/she identifies 
others (e.g., his/her subordinates) as the reason.  
6. When performance in this person team does not go favorably, he/she makes sure 
that his/her subordinates receive disciplinary actions.  
7. This person identifies others (e.g., his/her subordinates) to apologize to constituents 
(e.g., superiors, followers or customers) for his/her team’s mistakes. 
8. This person makes excuses for his/her mistakes at work.  
9. This person blames others (e.g., his/her subordinates) for his/her mistakes at work.   
10. This person personally takes credit when his/her team performs well.  
11. This person rewards him/herself, or accepts rewards from others, when his/her 
team performs well.  
12. When performance in this person’s team goes well, he/she ensures that he/she 
receives recognition or rewards.  
13. This person personally takes credit when his/her subordinates contribute to good 
team performance.   
14. This person makes sure that his/her subordinates get recognized for good team 
performance. 
15. When performance in this person’s team goes well, he/she identifies others (e.g., 
his /her subordinates) rather than him/her as the reason. 
16. When performance in this person’s team goes well, he/she ensures that his/her 
subordinates rather than he/she receive recognition or rewards.  
17. This person makes sure that his/her subordinates get recognized if they contribute 
to good team performance. 
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Leader Accountability Scale Validation Survey (CFA Survey) 
          
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Other-rating Items  
Please think of a leader with whom you have had contact in recent times.  
Next, you will see questions that describe an individual’s actions. For each item, please rate 
your level of agreement when thinking of this leader you have mentioned above. When you 
see “his/her team”, think about the team that the leader supervises, which may include you 
and his/her other subordinates. 
 Leader accountability (16 items) includes: 
1. This person looks to himself/herself first when his/her team’s results are disappointing 
2. When performance in this person team does not go favorably, he/she holds him or 
herself to account, for example, by receiving disciplinary actions. 
3. When performance in this person team does not go favorably, he/she identifies 
him/herself as the reason.   
4. This person apologizes to constituents (e.g., superiors, followers or customers) for 
his/her team’s mistakes. 
5. When performance in this person team does not go favorably, he/she makes sure that 
his/her subordinates receive disciplinary actions.  
6. This person identifies others (e.g., his/her subordinates) to apologize to constituents (e.g., 
superiors, followers or customers) for his/her team’s mistakes. 
7. This person makes excuses for his/her mistakes at work.  
8. This person blames others (e.g., his/her subordinates) for his/her mistakes at work.   
9. This person personally takes credit when his/her team performs well.  
10. This person rewards him/herself, or accepts rewards from others, when his/her team 
performs well.  
11. When performance in this person’s team goes well, he/she ensures that he/she receives 
recognition or rewards.  
12. This person personally takes credit when his/her subordinates contribute to good team 
performance.   
13. This person makes sure that his/her subordinates get recognized for good team 
performance. 
14. When performance in this person’s team goes well, he/she identifies others (e.g., his 
/her subordinates) rather than him/her as the reason. 
15. When performance in this person’s team goes well, he/she ensures that his/her 
subordinates rather than he/she receive recognition or rewards.  
16. This person makes sure that his/her subordinates get recognized if they contribute to 
good team performance. 
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Ethical leadership (10 items) 
1. This person listens to what employees have to say.  
2 .He/she disciplines employees who violate ethical standards.  
3. This person conducts his/her personal life in an ethical manner.  
4. He/she has the best interests of employees in mind.  
5. This person makes fair and balanced decisions.   
6. This person can be trusted.  
7. This person discusses business ethics or values with employees.  
8. This person sets an example of how to do things the right way in terms of ethics.  
9. This person defines success not just by results but also the way that they are obtained.  
10. This person, when making decisions, asks “what is the right thing to do?”  
Humility (9 items) 
1. This person actively seeks feedback, even if it is critical.  
2. He/she admits it when he/she doesn’t know how to do something. 
3. He/she acknowledges when others have more knowledge and skills than him/her.  
4. This person takes notice of others’ strengths.  
5. He/she often compliments others on their strengths.  
6. He/she shows appreciation for the unique contributions of others.  
7. This person is willing to learn from others.  
8. He/she is open to the ideas of others. 
9. This person is open to the advice of others.  
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Model Testing Survey 
          
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither Agree 
or Disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Time 1 Part 1: Leader self-rating: 
Demographic information:  
Q1: What is your gender?  
Q2: Your age?  
Q3: What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Q4: How long have you worked in this company?  
Leader’s external expectations  (8 items)  
1. I am held accountable for my actions at work. 
2. I often have to explain to others (e.g., followers or supervisors) why I 
do certain things at work. 
3. Top management holds me accountable for all of my decisions. 
4. If things at work do not go the way that they should, I will hear about it 
from top management. 
5. To a great extent, the success of my immediate work group rests on my 
shoulders. 
6. The jobs of many people at work depend on my success or failures.  
7. In the grand scheme of things, my efforts at work are very important. 
8.  Co-workers, subordinates, and bosses closely scrutinize my efforts at 
work. 
 
Part 2: For each item, please rate your level of agreement with the 
following statements when thinking of this individual who asked you to 
complete this questionnaire displays the behavior. When you see “his/her 
team”, think about the team that this individual supervises, which includes 
you and him/her other subordinates: 
Humility (9 items)-Follower rating 
1. My manager actively seeks feedback, even if it is critical.  
2. He/she admits it when he/she doesn’t know how to do something. 
3. He/she acknowledges when others have more knowledge and skills than 
him/her.  
4. My manager takes notice of others’ strengths.  
5. He/she often compliments others on their strengths.  
6. He/she shows appreciation for the unique contributions of others.  
7. My manager is willing to learn from others.  
8. He/she is open to the ideas of others. 
9. My manager is open to the advice of others.  
Time 2 Leader accountability (16 items) -Follower rating 
1. My manager looks to himself/herself first when his/her team’s results are 
disappointing. 
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2. When performance in this team does not go favorably, he/she holds him 
or herself to account, for example, by receiving disciplinary actions.  
3. When performance in this team does not go favorably, my manager 
identifies him/herself as the reason.  
4. My manager apologizes to constituents (e.g., superiors, followers or 
customers) for his/her team’s mistakes.  
5. My manager blames others (e.g., his/her subordinates) for his/her 
mistakes at work.   
6. When performance in this team does not go favorably, my manager 
identifies others (e.g., his/her subordinates) as the reason.   
7. My manager identifies others (e.g., his/her subordinates) to apologize to 
constituents (e.g., superiors, subordinates or customers) for the team’s 
mistakes.  
8. My manager makes excuses for his/her mistakes at work.  
9. When performance in this team goes well, my manager identifies others 
(e.g., his /her subordinates) rather than him/her as the reason.  
10. My manager ensures that his/her subordinates get recognized for good 
team performance.  
11. When performance in this team goes well, my manager ensures that 
his/her subordinates rather than he/she receives recognition or rewards.  
12. My manager makes sure that his/her subordinates get recognized if they 
contribute to good team performance.   
13. My manager personally takes credit when his/her subordinates 
contribute to good team performance.  
14. When performance in this team goes well, my manager ensures that 
he/she receives recognition or rewards.  
15. My manager personally takes credit when his/her team performs well.  
16. My manager rewards him/herself, or accepts rewards from others, when 
the team performs well.  
Leader prototypicality (5 items) -Follower rating 
1. My manager is a good example of the kind of people in our company.   
2. My manager has a lot in common with the members of our company.  
3. My manager represents what is characteristic about our company.  
4. My manager is very similar to what the members of the company's 
value.  
5. My manager represents what the company stands for.  
Time 3  For each item, please rate your level of agreement with the following 
statements when thinking of your team members as a whole display these 
behaviors.  
Team members’ collective accountability (16 items)-follower ratings 
1. My team members look to themselves first when my team’s results are 
disappointing. 
2. When performance in my team does not go favorably, my team members 
hold themselves to account, for example, by receiving disciplinary actions. 
3. When performance in my team does not go favorably, my team members 
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identifies themselves as the reason. 
4. My team members apologize to constituents (e.g., superiors, followers or 
customers) for my team’s mistakes. 
5. My team members blame others (e.g., peers) for their mistakes at work.  
6. When performance in my team does not go favorably, my team members 
identify others (e.g., his/her coworkers) as the reason.  
7. My team members identify others (e.g., his/her coworkers) to apologize 
to constituents (e.g., superiors, subordinates or customers) for the team’s 
mistakes. 
8. My team members make excuses for their mistakes at work. 
9. When performance in my team goes well, my team members identify 
others (e.g., their coworkers) rather than themselves as the reason. 
10. My team members ensure that their coworkers get recognized for good 
team performance. 
11. When performance in my team goes well, team members ensure that 
other people in the team rather than themselves receives recognition or 
rewards. 
12. My team members make sure that members in the team get recognized 
if they contribute to good team performance.  
13. Members in this team personally take credit when others in this team 
contribute to good team performance. 
14. When performance of this team goes well, members in this team ensure 
that they themselves receive recognition or rewards. 
15. Members in this team personally take credit when the team performs 
well. 
16. Members reward themselves, or accept rewards from others, when the 
team performs well.   
Time 4 Higher level managers’ rating  
Leader effectiveness (4 items) 
1. This manager’s performance is very high. 
2. This manager is very effective. 
3. This manager performs very well. 
4. This manager’s overall effectiveness is excellent. 
Team effectiveness (4 items) 
1. This team meets or exceeds its customers' expectations. 
2. This team does superb work. 
3. Critical quality errors occur frequently in this team's work. 
4. This team keeps getting better and better. 
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IRB APPROVAL 
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Table 1 
Categorization of Leader Accountability 
 Internal Attribution External Attribution 
Good Performance Self-benefitting accountability Other-benefitting accountability 
Poor Performance Other-benefitting accountability Self-benefitting accountability 
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Table 2 
Summary of Representative Studies about Accountability  
Scale development paper 
Study Definitions of 
accountability  
Sample item 
(# of items ) 
Sample 
features 
Results Focus on 
External 
expectations/ 
ownership 
Acceptance 
of rewards or 
punishments 
(Yes or no) 
Hall, 2005 
 
An implicit or explicit 
expectation that one’s 
decisions or actions will 
be subject to evaluation 
by some salient 
audience(s) with the 
belief that there exists the 
potential for one to 
receive either rewards or 
sanctions based on the 
expected evaluation 
Top 
management 
holds me 
accountable for 
all of my 
decisions. 
(8 items) 
224 
Employees 
from a large 
public 
university 
and a 
medium-
sized, 
family-
owned 
business 
Informal norms, 
achievement 
striving, 
conscientiousne
ss and 
agreeableness 
are positively 
related to felt 
accountability 
External 
expectations 
No 
Wood & 
Winston, 
2007,  
 
The leader’s implicit or 
explicit expectation that 
he/she will be publicly 
linked to his/her actions, 
words, or reactions; the 
expectation that the leader 
may be called on to 
explain his or her beliefs, 
decisions, commitments, 
or actions to constituents; 
The leader 
fulfills the 
commitments 
he/she makes to 
constituents 
(30 items)  
148 
employees 
from diverse 
jobs  
Developed a 
scale of leader 
accountability 
External 
expectations/ 
ownership 
No 
  
 
8
1
 
and the willing 
acceptance of the 
responsibilities inherent 
in the leadership position 
to serve the well-being of 
the organization 
Empirical study  
Field Study 
Study Definitions of 
accountability 
 Sample item Sample 
features 
Results  Role of 
accountability  
Similar 
studies 
Hochwarter et 
al., 2007 
An implicit or explicit 
expectation that one’s 
decisions or actions will 
be subject to evaluation 
by some salient 
audience(s) with the 
belief that there exists the 
potential for one to 
receive either rewards or 
sanctions based on this 
expected evaluation. (Hall 
et al., 2003, p.23) 
I often have to 
explain why I 
do certain things 
at work 
(Hochwarter et 
al. 2003) 
220 
employees 
of a 
financial 
management 
firm located 
in the 
Southeastern 
United 
States 
felt 
accountability 
would lead to 
higher job 
performance 
ratings when 
coupled with 
high levels of 
political skill  
independent 
variable 
Hall, Zinko, 
Perryman,& 
Ferris, 2009); 
Wikhamn & 
Hall., 2014;  
Laird et al., 
2009;  
Hall et al., 
2006; 
Hochwarter et 
al., 2005; 
Breaux et al., 
2009  
Wallace et al., 
2011 
an implicit or explicit 
expectation that one’s 
decisions or actions will 
be subject to evaluation 
by some salient 
audience(s) with the 
belief that there exists the 
 “I am held very 
accountable for 
my actions in 
my store” and “I 
often have to 
explain why I 
do certain things 
539 
managers 
with at least 
two assistant 
managers 
and one 
store 
psychological 
empowerment 
climate relates 
to performance 
only under 
conditions of 
high-felt 
moderator  
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potential for one to 
receive either rewards or 
sanctions based on the 
expected evaluation” 
(Hall et al., 2003, p. 33) 
at work. 
(Hochwarter et 
al. 2003) 
manager 
responding 
from each 
store. 
accountability 
Tetlock et al., 
2013 
Process accountability, 
employees expect to 
justify efforts and 
strategies used to generate 
results. 
The focus is on inputs, 
not outcomes. Under pure 
outcome accountability, 
the focus flips: employees 
expect to deliver tangible, 
end-state results, with 
little interest in 
explanations of how they 
did it (Beach & Mitchell, 
1978; Curley, Yates, & 
Abrams, 1986). 
Two 9-point 
Likert-type 
unipolar scales, 
measuring 
preferences for 
weak or strong 
forms of process 
and outcome 
accountability, 
separately. 
Seventy-five 
MBA 
students and 
executives 
(study 1) 
and 
Seventy-two 
executive 
MBA (study 
2) 
 
conservatives 
prefer outcome 
accountability 
and liberals 
prefer process 
accountability in 
an unspecified 
policy 
domain 
dependent 
variable 
 
Lab Study  
Study Definitions of 
accountability  
Manipulation Sample 
features 
Results Role of 
accountability  
Similar 
studies 
Castilla, 2015 A set of procedures 
making certain 
individuals (or a group of 
individuals) responsible 
for ensuring the fair 
compensation and 
The 
organization 
adopted 
accountability 
into its 
performance-
U.S. service 
organization 
 Accountability 
reduced the pay 
gap  
independent 
variable 
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distribution of rewards 
among employees inside 
their organization (p.351). 
reward system  
Sedikides et 
al., 2002 
Expectation that they will 
be called on to explain, 
justify, and defend their 
self- evaluations to one or 
more others. 
You will be 
asked to fully 
explain, justify, 
and defend the 
grades you 
assigned 
yourself on each 
and every 
dimension. 
77, 82, 150, 
and 115 
university 
students in 
four studies  
accountability 
curtails self-
enhancement  
independent 
variable 
Tetlock, 
1985;  
Giessner et 
al., 2013; 
Morris & 
Moore, 2000; 
Paolini et al., 
2009;  
Palmer et al., 
2005;  
Pretsch et al., 
2014;  
Pinter et al., 
2007;  
Mero et al., 
2006. 
Peng, Dunn, 
& Conlon, 
2015 
Answerable for 
conducting oneself in a 
manner that is consistent 
with relevant 
prescriptions for how 
things should be 
(Schlenker & Weigold, 
1989, p. 24). 
High 
accountability 
was 
manipulated by 
either telling the 
negotiators that 
their direct 
supervisor set 
the performance 
expectations and 
would 
228 students 
(study 1) 
and 170 
students 
(study 2) 
from a 
public 
university  
  
Prevention-
focused dyads 
achieved better 
joint financial 
outcomes than 
promotion-
focused dyads in 
situations where 
there is high 
accountability. 
 moderator Converse et 
al., 2014; 
Rus, van 
Knippenberg, 
& Wisse, 
2012; 
Pitesa & 
Thau, 2013;  
Blader & 
Rothman, 
2014. 
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administer the 
rewards. 
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Table 3 
Exploratory Factor Analysis  
 Factor 
1 2 3 4 
1. This person looks to himself/herself first when his/her team’s results are disappointing  .74   
2. When performance in this person team does not go favorably, he/she holds him or herself to account, for 
example, by receiving disciplinary actions. 
 .75   
3. When performance in this person team does not go favorably, he/she identifies him/herself as the reason.    .81   
4. This person apologizes to constituents (e.g., superiors, followers or customers) for his/her team’s mistakes.  .48   
5. When performance in this person team does not go favorably, he/she identifies others (e.g., his/her 
subordinates) as the reason.  
   .50 
6. When performance in this person team does not go favorably, he/she makes sure that his/her subordinates 
receive disciplinary actions.  
    
7. This person identifies others (e.g., his/her subordinates) to apologize to constituents (e.g., superiors, followers 
or customers) for his/her team’s mistakes. 
   .49 
8. This person makes excuses for his/her mistakes at work.     .83 
9. This person blames others (e.g., his/her subordinates) for his/her mistakes at work.      .77 
10. This person personally takes credit when his/her team performs well.  .70    
11. This person rewards him/herself, or accepts rewards from others, when his/her team performs well.  .87    
12. When performance in this person’s team goes well, he/she ensures that he/she receives recognition or rewards.  .66    
13. This person personally takes credit when his/her subordinates contribute to good team performance.   .69    
14. This person makes sure that his/her subordinates get recognized for good team performance.   .75  
15. When performance in this person’s team goes well, he/she identifies others (e.g., his /her subordinates) rather 
than him/her as the reason. 
  .75  
16. When performance in this person’s team goes well, he/she ensures that his/her subordinates rather than he/she 
receive recognition or rewards.  
  .90  
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17. This person makes sure that his/her subordinates get recognized if they contribute to good team performance.   .81  
Note. N=160. Factor Loadings from Maximum Likelihood with Oblimin Rotation of 17 Items of Accountability.
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Table 4 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
Model Comparison  CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR AIC 
Model 1: four factors .96 .96 .06 .05 11111.92 
Model 2: three factor model: combine internal 
for good and external for bad  
.86 .84 .12 .08 11387.08 
Model 3: three factor model: combine internal 
for bad and external for good 
.87 .84 .12 .07 11369.46 
Model 4: two factor model –self-benefitting and 
other-benefitting 
.76 .72 .14 .10 11625.31 
Model 5: one factor model-accountability as one 
factor 
.65 .60 .19 .10 12778.24 
Model 6: self-benefitting and other-benefitting 
as two higher-order factors 
.96 .95 .06 .05 11122.94 
Model 7: accountability as one higher-order 
factor 
.93 .91 .09 .12 12018.23 
Note: N= 222. Confirmatory factor analysis with only accountability Items. χ2 = Chi-
square test of model fit; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; 
RMSEA = Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual; AIC= Akaike's Information Criterion.  
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Table 5 
Discriminant Validity: Accountability with Ethical Leadership and Humility  
Model CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR χ2 Df ∆df ∆χ2 S-B 
factor 
Model 1 (baseline model): 4-factor model 
including leader self-benefitting and other-
benefitting accountability as one higher-order 
factor with two first-order factors, ethical 
leadership and humility as two separate factors.   
.91 .90 .08 .05 1105.20** 550    1.23 
Model 2: 3-factor model with leader self-
benefitting accountability as one second-order 
factor, combining with ethical leadership and 
other-benefitting accountability as one factor, and 
humility as one factor.   
.85 .84 .08 .06 1439.66** 555 5 226.70** 1.24 
Model 3: 3-factor model with leader self-
benefitting accountability as one second-order 
factor, combining with humility and other-
benefitting accountability as one factor, and 
ethical leadership as one factor.   
.85 .84 .09 .06 1435.47** 555 5 175.31** 1.24 
Model 4: 3-factor model with leader other-
benefitting accountability as one second-order 
factor, combining with ethical leadership and 
self-benefitting accountability as one factor, and 
humility as one factor.   
.81 .80 .10 .07 1664.24** 555 5 215.04** 1.25 
Model 5: 2-factor model with leader other-
benefitting accountability as one second-order 
factor, combining with humility and self-
.80 .79 .10 .08 1725.18** 555 5 228.62** 1.25 
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benefitting accountability as one factor, and 
ethical leadership as one factor.   
Model 6: 2-factor model including leader self-
benefitting and other-benefitting accountability as 
one-second order factor, combining with ethical 
leadership and humility as one factor.  
.86 .85 .08 .06 1407.46** 553 3 214.87** 1.23 
Model 7: 1-factor model including leader self-
benefitting, other-benefitting accountability 
combining with ethical leadership and humility. 
.72 .70 .12 .08 2248.22** 560 10 449.87** 1.26 
Notes: N=222. CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index. RMSEA = Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation; 
SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; χ2 = Satorra-Bentler scaled Chi-square test of model fit; d.f. = degree of freedom; 
∆χ2 = Difference in Chi-Square with Satorra-Bentler scaled adjusted; ∆df = Difference in degrees of freedom compared with Model 1. 
S-B factor= Satorra-Bentler Scaling Correction Factor.  ** p < 0.01.    
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 Table 6 
Accountability Discriminant Validity with Other Follower-Report Constructs  
Model Comparison  CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR χ2 Df ∆df ∆χ2 
Model 1 (Baseline model): Six-factor model  .97 .95 .06 .05 80.11 50   
Model 2: Combine leader self-benefitting and collect self-
benefitting  
.95 .93 .08 .07 103.31 55 5 23.2** 
 
Model 3: Combine leader other-benefitting and collect other-
benefitting 
.94 .92 .08 .06 111.17 55 5 31.06** 
 
Model 4: Combine leader self-benefitting and leader other-
benefitting 
.89 .85 .11 .09 151.84 55 5 71.73** 
 
Model 5: Combine collect self-benefitting and collect other-
benefitting 
.88 .83 .12 .11 165.46 55 5 85.35** 
 
Model 6: Combine leader self-benefitting and collect other-
benefitting  
.88 .83 .12 .09 166.56 55 5 86.45** 
 
Model 7: Combine leader other-benefitting and collect self-
benefitting   
.91 .87 .10 .08 143.45 55 5 63.34** 
 
Model 8: Combine leader self-benefitting and humility .88 .83 .12 .10 169.71 55 5 89.60** 
Model 9: Combine leader self-benefitting and prototypicality .87 .81 .12 .12 180.99 55 5 100.88** 
Model 10: Combine leader other-benefitting and humility .88 .82 .12 .09 171.88 55 5 91.77** 
Model 11: Combine leader other-benefitting and 
prototypicality 
.91 .87 .10 .07 142.60 55 5 
62.49** 
Model 12: Combine collect self-benefitting and humility .90 .85 .11 .09 153.37 55 5 73.26** 
Model 13: Combine collect self-benefitting and prototypicality .87 .81 .12 .13 178.60 55 5 98.49** 
Model 14: Combine collect other-benefitting and humility .88 .83 .12 .09 166.35 55 5 86.24** 
Model 15: Combine collect other-benefitting and 
prototypicality 
.91 .88 .10 .07 137.07 55 5 
56.96** 
Model 16: Combine humility and prototypicality .86 .80 .13 .09 185.44 55 5 105.33** 
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Note. CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index. RMSEA = Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; χ2 = Chi-Square Test of Model Fit; d.f. = degree of freedom; ∆χ2 = Difference in Chi-
Square; ∆df = Difference in degrees of freedom compared with the baseline Model.   
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Table 7 
Rwg and ICCs for follower-rated variables  
 Rwg-
Median  
ICC(1) ICC(2) 
1. Leader humility .96 .18* .39 
2. Leader self-benefitting accountability .93 .23* .40 
3. Leader other-benefitting accountability .93 .54** .72 
4. Leader organization prototypicality .93 .22* .37 
5. Collective self-benefitting accountability .96 .41* .59 
6. Collective other-benefitting accountability .92 .29* .46 
** p < .01, * p < .05.  
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Table 8 
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations  
Variables  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Leader external expectations 4.94 0.88 .79         
2. Leader humility 5.63 1.03 .21 .95        
3. Leader self-benefitting accountability 3.07 0.71 .05 -.20 .87       
4. Leader other-benefitting accountability 5.06 0.82 .18 .56** -.29 .91      
5. Leader organization prototypicality 4.93 0.89 -.06 .59** -.15 .55** .89     
6. Collective self-benefitting accountability 3.51 0.78 -.13 -.39* .63** -.39* -.19 .82    
7. Collective other-benefitting accountability 4.68 0.69 .09 .43** -.16 .55** .36* -.23 .82   
8. Leader effectiveness 5.13 0.94 -.06 .16 -.22 .33* .12 -.35* .33* .91  
9. Team effectiveness  5.08 0.93 -.06 .14 .05 .19 -.08 -.08 .13 .56** .73 
Note: ** p < .01, * p < .05 (2-tailed). N=57. 
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 Table 9 
 Mediation effects and Bootstrapping Tests 
 Path a 
 
Path b 
 
Path c 
 
Indirect effect  
(95% CI) 
Main Effect Mediation Model     
Path 1. Humility  leader self-benefiting accountability collect self-
benefiting accountability leader effectiveness 
-.14 .62** -.49* .04+(-.00, .26) 
Path 2. Leader self-benefitting accountability  collect self-benefitting 
accountability   leader effectiveness  
 .62** -.49* -.30*(-.65, -.04) 
Path 3. Humility  leader other-benefitting accountability collect other-
benefitting accountability  leader effectiveness 
.44** .40* .64* .11*(.02, .42)  
Path 4. Leader other-benefitting accountability  collect other-benefitting 
accountability  leader effectiveness 
 .40* .64* .26*(.03, .83) 
Path 5. Humility  leader self-benefiting accountability collect self-
benefiting accountability team effectiveness 
-.14 .62**  -.16* .01(-.02, .18) 
Path 6. Leader self-benefitting accountability  collect self-benefitting 
accountability  team effectiveness  
 .62** -.16* -.10 (-.42, .22) 
Note: +p< .10, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Bootstrapping = 10,000 times.  
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Table 10 
Moderated Mediation effects and Bootstrapping Tests 
 Path a 
 
Path b 
 
Path c 
 
Indirect effect  
(95% CI) 
Difference in 
indirect effects 
(95% CI) 
Moderated Mediation Model      
Path 7. Leader self-benefitting accountabilitycollect self-benefitting accountability leader effectiveness  
           Under high organization prototypicality  .77** -.49* -.38*(-.85, -.05) -.25+(-.97, .03) 
           Under low organization prototypicality   .25** -.49* -.12 (-.63, .10)  
Path 8. Humility leader self-benefitting accountabilitycollect self-benefitting accountability leader effectiveness 
           Under high organization prototypicality -.14 .77** -.49* .06+ (-.01, .31) .04+ (-.01, .33) 
           Under low organization prototypicality -.14 .25** -.49* .02 (-.01, .25)   
      
Path 9. Leader self-benefitting accountabilitycollect self-benefitting accountability team effectiveness 
           Under high organization prototypicality  .77**  -.16* -.13(-.51, .17)  
           Under low organization prototypicality  .25**  -.16* -.04 (-.39, .06) -.09(-.66, .08) 
Path 10. Humility leader self-benefitting accountabilitycollect self-benefitting accountability team effectiveness  
           Under high organization prototypicality -.14 .77**  -.16* .02 (-.02, .20)  
           Under low organization prototypicality -.14 .25**  -.16* .01 (-.01, .13 ) .01(-.01, .21) 
 
Note: +p< .10, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Bootstrapping = 10,000 times.  
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Figure 1 
Theoretical Model of Accountability in Teams  
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Figure 2 
Path Coefficients of the Theoretical Model (Unstandardized coefficients are shown, and red arrows are paths that are significant) 
 
 
** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Figure 3 
Simple Slope of the Interaction 
 
** p < .01. 
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